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1  See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS, Table 8 (1999).  The vast majority of female workers work full-time.  Based
on data for 1993, approximately 16% of female workers worked part-time, defined as
thirty-five or fewer hours.  See Marianne A. Ferber & Jane Waldfogel, The Long-Term
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FAMILY LEAVE AND THE GENDER WAGE GAP
by
Michael Selmi*
   The patterns tied to both the reality and the assumptions
regarding women’s labor force behavior suggest that if there is to be
greater equality for women in the workplace, it will be necessary for men
to change their behavior, both in and out of the workplace, in order for
employers to begin to change theirs.   Despite improvements over the last
two decades, including significant changes in women’s labor force
behavior, gender inequality continues to pervade, and in many ways
define, the American workplace.  The problem persists because men have
not yet changed their behavior, and employers continue to exact penalties
on women both because of their actual behavior, which differs from
men’s, but also based on their expectation that women will leave the
workforce when they have children.  Making more progress on workplace
equality will require prodding men to act more like women, rather than
trying to induce women to act more like men.  In this way, we will create
a new workplace norm where employees will be expected to have and
spend time with their children and employers will adapt to that reality. 
   As an indication of just how much women’s labor force behavior
has changed, seventy-five percent of women between the ages of 20 and
54 now work,1 including sixty-five percent of women with children under
Consequences of Nontraditional Employment, 121 MONTHLY LABOR RVW. 3, 4-5
(1998).
2  See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT
CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES IN 1998, Table 4 (1999) (reporting women with children’s
labor force participation).
3  For a discussion of the wage gap see section I infra. 
4  These issues are discussed in greater detail infra at text accompanying notes 70-
74 (housework) and notes 105-07 (occupational segregation).  For a recent informative
discussion on houswork see Chloe E. Bird, Gender, Household Labor and Psychological
Distress: The Impact of the Amount and Division of Housework, 40 J. OF HEALTH &
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 32, 38 (1999), and for a recent discussion of the question of
occupational segregation see Francine D. Blau, Patricia Simpson, & Deborah Anderson,
Continuing Progress? Trends in Occupational Segregation in the United States Over the
1970s and 1980s, 4 FEMINIST ECON. 29 (1998).    
5  See VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? 7 (1997).  In this article, I will not focus
on gender issues that arise in promotions, although much of the story would be similar to
the one I discuss.  For a discussion on the issue of the glass ceiling see U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE
NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL (1995). 
6  For example, a 1998 poll conducted found that 40% of the respondents would
like to return to the gender roles of the 1950s.  See Richard Morin, With More Equity,
More Sweat, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 22, 1998 at A1 (reporting that “4 in 10 of those
surveyed said, it would be better to return to the gender roles of the 1950s.”). 
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age six.2   Nevertheless, women  still earn  between seventy and seventy-
five percent of what men earn.3  Working women also continue to perform
between two to three times as much housework as men, are still
overwhelmingly responsible for child rearing, and  occupy different jobs
than men.4  They also lag far behind in positions of power, for example,
accounting for only eight percent of the directors on Wall Street as of
1996.5
   An important reason why we have failed to make more progress
on issues of gender equity, is that as a society we have paid woefully little
attention to the issue, in large part because we remain conflicted over
women’s role in the workplace.6   The United States has one of the
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
7  Jane Waldfogel recently summarized the legislation, “Until the passage of the
Family and Medical Leave Act in 1993, the United States had no national maternity leave
policy, and even now, it is tied with Switzerland in offering the shortest period of leave . . .
Moreover, the United States is the only country of [the 15 industrial countries surveyed]
that does not offer some degree of paid leave.”  See Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the
“Family Gap” in Pay for Women and Children, 12 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 137, 140-
41 (1998).  For a comprehensive review of European and Canadian leave policies see
KIRSTEN S. WEVER, ASSESSING TEMPORARY WAGE REPLACEMENT FOR FAMILY AND
MEDICAL LEAVE 7-10 (1996).  Wever notes that as of 1989, “[s]ixteen European countries
and Canada mandate an average of 33 weeks of paid maternity/parental leave . . .”  Id. at
8.  
8  See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, WORKER’S COMPENSATION:
BENEFITS, COVERAGE & COSTS 1994-95 at 8 (1997);  Daniel McMurrer & Amy B.
Chasanov, Trends in Unemployment Benefits, 118 MONTHLY LABOR RVW. 30, 30 (1995)
(“In 1993, more than $22 billion was paid in [unemployment] benefits.”).  
9  See WILLIAM J. WIATROWSKI, TRACKING CHANGES IN BENEFIT COSTS,
COMPENSATION & WORKING CONDITIONS 32, 33-34 (1999) (nothing that legally-required
costs accounted for 9.6% of payroll costs in 1998 compared to 4.1% in 1959).
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highest female labor force participation rates among industrial countries,
but it also has done the least to assist those women with the demands of
work and family.  As is well known, the United States was one of the last
industrialized countries to adopt a family leave law and even today offers
the least generous family leave benefits.7
  
   The weakness of our commitment to facilitating work and family
issues can be highlighted by examining our expenditures on other
workplace benefits.  As a society, we spend more than $50 billion
annually on workers’ compensation, with another $20 billion devoted to
unemployment benefits,8 and legally mandated benefits now  account for
nearly 10 percent of payroll costs.9  In addition to these workplace
benefits, we subsidize health insurance and pensions, as well as non-
workplace items such as home mortgages, all of which costs billions of
dollars annually.  And yet, when it comes to facilitating family leave as a
way of providing some balance between work and family, on the federal
level we spend practically nothing primarily because we are concerned
about the effects the costs might have on employers and wages. 
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
10  See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6,
codified at sections 2 & 5 of 29 U.S.C.  
11  See text accompanying notes 215-17.
12  The federal government commissioned two studies to assess the impact of the
FMLA which are summarized in UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, A WORKABLE
BALANCE (1998).  I discuss this report in section II.B. infra.    
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             Increasing our societal commitment to family leave issues is
critically important for at least two closely related reasons.  First, if we are
to make greater progress on gender equality in the workplace — progress
that I will demonstrate is still much needed — we must challenge the
existing stereotypes surrounding family leave, which invariably negatively
impact women.  As we will see, women are expected to be both at work
and at home, and it is generally expected that their work at home will
adversely affect their performance in the workplace.  To close the gender
gap further, we need to take steps to disrupt both the reality and the
expectations of how women’s relation to their children affects their labor
market behavior and rewards.  Second, creating a workplace where it is
expected that workers will have, and take care of, children is essential to
furthering our societal interest in the family.  
   The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) was one effort,
and to date the only federal effort, to provide some much needed relief to
working parents.10  However, because the Act offers such limited benefits
— unpaid leave for up to twelve weeks following the birth or adoption of
a child — it has failed to ease the burden on women, and indeed the Act’s
effects have likely been more negative than positive.  Since the passage
of the FMLA in 1993, no significant state family leave  legislation has
been enacted, even though there was a trend prior to the Act’s passage
toward implementing state leave policies that were more generous than
the FMLA.11  In addition, recent data indicate that very few workers
utilize the federal legislation, and women are considerably more likely
than their male counterparts to avail themselves of the statutory leave
provisions.12  Accordingly, in the eyes of employers, family leave remains
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
13  Nearly every poll suggests that men would like to take more family leave, and
would be willing to trade some income for more time with their family.  See, e.g., Ellen
Galinsky, Jjames T. Bond & Dana E. Friedman, The Role of Employers in Addressing the
Needs of Employed Parents, 52 J. OF SOCIAL ISSUES 111, 116-18 (1996) (both men and
women would prefer to work less, and both equally likely to trade salary for greater child
assistance benefits); ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION AFTER ALL 244 (1997) (noting that many
of the respondents “believed companies that turn employees into workaholics violated the
moral principle of balance, as do people who neglect their family ties for higher income
and occupational prestige”); Lisa Belkin, Bars to Equality of Sexes Seen as Eroding,
Slowly, NEW YORK TIMES, at A26 (Aug. 20, 1989) (reporting that 40% of men surveyed
said they would quit their job to spend more time with their children).  A recent poll also
indicated that men and women supported (by substantial margins) expanding the Family
and Medical Leave Act to small employers, and providing some form of insurance to cover
family leave.  See NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN AND FAMILIES, FAMILY
MATTERS: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF WOMEN AND MEN, Table 7 (1998).      
14  For an excellent recent discussion of the cumulative disadvantage see  VALIAN,
supra note 5.
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a woman’s issue, one for which all women are being penalized in the
marketplace.
   This latter point relates to the persistence of the gender wage gap,
a central focus of this article.  Contributing, indeed perhaps explaining the
bulk of workplace disparities based on gender, is a fact that plainly resists
change:  women continue overwhelmingly to be primarily responsible for
childcare and child rearing.  Despite the passage of the FMLA,  and
despite the frequent claim by men that they would like more time to be
involved with their families,13 strikingly few men take any significant
paternity leave or assume equal responsibility for child rearing.  And thus,
things continue largely as they were —  women have less of an attachment
to the labor force than men (though the differences are narrowing), they
miss more work than men, take more time off when they have children,
and generally work fewer hours, all of which contribute to a cumulative
disadvantage, one that exacts a heavy price in terms of salary, promotions
and workplace responsibility.14  Economist Claudia Goldin recently
estimated that only about thirteen percent of college educated women
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
15  Claudia Goldin, Career and Family: College Women Look to the Past, 45-48
in GENDER & FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE (Francine Blau & Ronald Ehrenberg
eds. 1997).
16  See infra section II.
17  See, e.g., JOYCE GELB & MARIAN LIEF PALLEY, WOMEN AND PUBLIC
POLICIES: REASSESSING GENDER POLITICS 211 (1996) (“[D]espite increased social
acceptance of work for women, the role of women in home and family has remained
largely the same . . .”); JOAN K. PETERS, WHEN MOTHERS WORK 10 (1997) (“Most
women make more than the necessary changes when they have children; most men make
none.”).
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successfully attained both family and career by midlife.15
 
  Even those women who do not have children or who experience
very short exits from the labor market when they do have children are
adversely affected by what is often labeled statistical discrimination — 
the use of group statistics as proxies for information, in this instance the
likelihood that more women than men will leave the workforce to have
children with the further assumption that the accompanying labor force
disruption will negatively impact productivity.16 Employers often treat
women differently because as a group women do act differently from their
male counterparts, even though the majority of women now vary from the
hypothesized female employment path. 
   If we are to make more progress, it will be necessary for men to
change their behavior in the labor market by, at a minimum, taking more
leave around the birth or adoption of their children. Yet, history suggests
that accomplishing this change will be no easy feat.  Since at least the
1960s, women as a group have altered their labor market behavior
substantially, whereas the change for men has been marginal at best.17
Exhorting men to become more involved with family life, or touting the
importance of families, is thus unlikely to ease the burden on women to
any significant extent.  To try to get at this dilemma, I will propose that
the FMLA be amended so as to create greater incentives for men to take
leave around the birth or adoption of a child.  These proposed
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
18  See sections III.B. infra.
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amendments will vary from forcing men to take six weeks of paid leave,
to the less drastic measure of creating a governmental contract set-aside
program aimed at rewarding employers who succeed in encouraging their
employees to take family leave.18  As a means of justifying these
proposals, I will demonstrate that outside of Sweden, where success is
higher than anywhere else but lower than is often suggested, men have
never voluntarily taken significant amounts of child-related leave, and the
disproportionate burden that falls on women explains a substantial portion
of their labor market inequality.  Indeed, I will suggest that little short of
forcing men, or creating strong incentives aimed at employers, will suffice
to alter workplace patterns in a way that will enable women to make
greater progress.
    Equally important, creating ways through which men may become
more involved in child rearing should have the effect of transforming the
workplace so that the female model of the worker, rather than the male
model, becomes the norm.  If men begin to act more like women,
employers may come to expect their employees to undertake the
responsibilities of child rearing and to accommodate that responsibility
more than they have so far been willing to do.  Assuming such a
transformation were possible, family leave benefits would then become
part of the standard package of employee benefits, something akin to
worker’s compensation, or health and safety regulations, which today are
seen as an integral part of doing business despite their costs. 
    It is surely possible to address the topic of family leave and
workplace inequality from a number of perspectives, and in this article, I
will concentrate on childbearing leave and will say little directly about
child rearing, which also likely plays a significant role in furthering
workplace inequality.  I focus on childbearing for two reasons, and there
is a third subsidiary reason that likewise supports my choice.  First, leave
following the birth of a child is already part of the policy agenda as a
result of the FMLA and therefore is currently involved in the debate over
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
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attaining some balance between work and family.  At this time, it seems
far more difficult to create a workable plan relating to child rearing, given
that it is ongoing and less predictable than childbearing.  Second, the data
indicate that much of the inequity that continues to define the workplace
revolves around childbearing rather than child rearing.  Most economic
explanations and assumptions regarding why women receive lower wages
are tied to the likelihood that a woman will leave the workforce when she
has a child.  This is true with respect to the human capital explanation
involving investments in education, experience and training, as well as
theories of statistical discrimination, both of which will be discussed in
detail shortly.  In contrast, child rearing plays a lesser role in explaining
the source of workplace inequality.  That said, the two concepts are not
unrelated, and here I turn to the third reason:  if we succeed in breaking
up the patterns surrounding childbirth than we are likely to make inroads
into the patterns of child rearing as well.
   As may already be clear, I intend to focus largely, though not
exclusively, on empirical work originating in economics and sociology.
The gender wage gap has been studied extensively, and although the two
disciplines come at the issue slightly differently both have increasingly
moved toward empirical analyses involving a bounty of available data
sources, some collected by the government while other data comes from
particular firms.  I want to concentrate on the data because it is so rich and
informative, and yet too often ignored in legal analyses of gender
inequality.  Looking at the data closely may help liberate us from some of
the reigning myths regarding women’s workforce behavior because
women’s  behavior deviates substantially from what much of neoclassical
economic theory predicts.  But I also want to emphasize that the
persistence of gender inequality is about more than economic interests,
and necessarily implicates broader issues of gender roles and power.
Improving on the current conditions will thus, as Nancy Fraser has
recently argued, require “changing both political economy and culture, so
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
19  NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE
“POSTSOCIALIST” CONDITION 28 (1997).
20  See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULLETIN 2340
(April 1998).  To provide an example of the disparity based on the measure used, in 1996,
the female-to-male ratio for full-time workers measured by hourly wage was 81.2%, for
weekly wages the percentage was 75.0%, and the annual ratio was 73.8%.  Id.   For a
detailed discussion of the gender wage gap see FRANCINE D. BLAU, MARIANNE A. FERBER
AND ANNE E. WINKLER, THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN AND WORK 134-43 (1998). 
21  BLAU ET AL, supra note 20, at 136 (noting that the earnings ratio measured by
annual earnings “did not increase between 1990 and 1995" while the weekly earnings ratio
has declined since 1993).   
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as to undo the vicious circle of economic and cultural subordination.”19 
   This article will proceed in three parts.  The first part seeks to
understand the nature and persistence of the gender wage gap and
explores both the data, and the various theories, that help explain the gap.
From there, I will analyze the effects of the FMLA, including two recent
surveys commissioned by the government that provide some insight into
just how little relief  the act actually provides.  The third and final part will
discuss various ways in which the statute might be amended to further the
goal of reducing workplace inequality.
                     
I.  UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER WAGE GAP.
   The most common measure of gender inequality in the workplace
is the ratio of women's to men's wages, what is often referred to as the
gender wage gap.  In 1997, women's salaries averaged between seventy
and seventy-six percent of men’s salaries, depending on the measure that
is used.20  These figures represent a substantial improvement in the level
of inequality that persisted through much of the 1970s, when the wage gap
hovered around sixty percent, although most of the improvement occurred
during the 1980s as the pay gap has largely stagnated during the last
decade.21
     The earnings ratio is a wildly popular measure, but the average
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
22  A number of other interpretive difficulties can arise.  For example, focusing on
distributions indicates that greater numbers of women are found at the lowest wage level,
while men dominate at the top of the wage scale.  See, e.g., Annette Bernhardt, Martina
Morris, Mark S. Handcock, Women’s Gains or Men’s Losses? A Closer Look at the
Shrinking Gender Gap in Earnings, 101 AMER. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 302 (1995) (analyzing
relative wage distributions as opposed to median earnings).  The average figure can also
dilute some of the existing inequalities due to racial disparities in the incomes of men.  As
is well known, black men earn considerably less than white men, and wage differences
between black men and women are smaller than among whites, so that including blacks
within the averages can mask just how much advantage white men have in the labor
market.  See DAPHNE SPAIN AND SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, BALANCING ACT: MOTHERHOOD,
MARRIAGE & EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN WOMEN 131-32 (1997) (discussing racial
disparities); David A. Cotter et al., Occupational Gender Segregation and the Earnings
Gap: Changes in the 1980s, 24 SOCIAL SCI. RSCH. 439, 441 (1995) ("For minorities,
gender differentials in earnings . . . are smaller than for whites; however, this is because of
the disadvantaged position of minority men and not because of any special privileges for
minority women.").  Moreover, the average figure typically includes only full-time
employees, thus excluding the disproportionately female-dominated and lower-paid part-
time workforce.  
23  For example, in 1995 the earnings ratio for workers aged 25-34 was 77.8%,
whereas the ratio for those aged 45-54 was 58.1%.   See BLAU ET AL, supra note 20, at
137.  See also CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP 59 (1990) (noting
discrpency between experiences of younger and older women); Margaret Mooney Marini
& Pi-Ling Fan, The Gender Gap in Earnings at Career Entry, 62 AMER. SOCIOLOGICAL
RVW. 588, 597 (1997) (women in sample earned 84% of men at career entry).
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figures can be somewhat misleading in that they mask women's increasing
heterogeneity, and as a comparative measure likewise overlook some
structural features of the labor market that may explain the decline in the
wage gap more than the actual progress of women.22  For example, in
today's labor market, older women suffer far greater wage disparity than
younger women; indeed, women entering the labor market today often
begin their careers in salary parity with men, or with minor wage
differentials, and wage disparities tend to arise following a number of
years of work experience.23  It is also worth noting that much of the
decrease in the wage gap during the last decade resulted from factors that
were only tangentially related to the improving labor market position of
women.  During the 1980s the wages of lower-income men concentrated
in manufacturing jobs fell sharply, particularly when compared to women
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
24  See SPAIN & BIANCHI, supra note 22, 108-110 (discussing effect on men's
declining wages and the gender gap). 
25   Id. at 116-17 (noting that “women were poised by 1980s to advance in the
labor force and the decade turned out to be a phenomenol one in terms of earnings
improvement for the well educated.”); Chinhui Juhn & Kevin M. Murphy, Wage
Inequality and Family Labor Supply, 15 J. OF LABOR ECON. 72, 78-80 (1997)
(documenting that women’s employment increased most dramatically at upper income
wages).
26  See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 41-42 (1991) (“Wage
rates are lower for women at least partly because they invest less than men in market
human capital, while the productivity of household time is presumably greater for women
partly because they invest more than men in household capital.”); see also Solomon
William Polachek, Occupational Self-Selection: A Human Capital Approach to Sex
Differences in Occupational Structure, 63 REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 60 (1981). 
Among many legal analysts, this theory is sometimes accepted without argument or
empirical support, but simply asserted as true.  See Larry Alexander, What Makes
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in service jobs where salaries improved modestly.24  Relatedly, there was
a significant increase in the wage growth among college-educated
workers, and large numbers of college-educated women entered the
workforce during the 1980s.25  These factors contributed to the decreasing
gender wage gap, and a significant portion of the decrease resulted at least
as much from the receding position of men as from improvements in the
labor market conditions of women.       
   Despite these limitations, the gender wage gap provides a useful
metric to understanding current labor market inequalities, as well as how
the condition of women has improved, or failed to improve, over time.  As
impressive as the decrease in wage disparity may be, there remains a
substantial gap between the earnings of men and women, at least twenty-
five percent or a quarter of one’s salary, and it is important to try to
understand the source of the persistent wage inequalities in order to
understand the role the law might play in reducing the disparity further. 
   Economists tend to view the wage gap as a product of choices,
or preferences, women make regarding their commitment to the labor
market.26  Many women leave the labor market for a period of time to
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes and Proxies, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 149, 210 (1992) (asserting that labor market disparities are the product of
"differences in job preferences between males and females"); Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1315 (1989)
(assuming for purposes of analysis that women invest less in human capital because they
will likely take time out from the labor market).
27  See infra text accompanying notes 78-82.
28  The issue of occupational segregation is discussed in more detail infra section
I.B.
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have and to raise children, and this withdrawal from the paid labor force
can adversely affect a woman's career as her skills may deteriorate with
time spent away from work, or fail to improve as they would if she stayed
in the labor force.  The likelihood that a woman may leave the labor force
to have and to care for children may affect her career decisions in other
ways as well.  Women may, for example, choose occupations where
continuous experience is less important to the career, or where the
benefits offered may compensate for lower salaries.27  These career
choices may also influence educational choices -- the choice of majors or
career paths, which may in turn lead to lower salaries and lower
opportunities for career progression.  These choices, the argument goes,
may help explain the severe labor market segregation that exists in the
United States, where it remains rare that women work in a job that is
integrated on the basis of gender.28
   As we will shortly see, the economists’ preferred explanations
sketched briefly above provide far more theoretical than empirical insight.
The extraordinary volume of empirical studies on the gender wage gap
demonstrates that women's choices –  about careers, education and work
histories  –  offer a limited understanding into the persistent gender
differentials that characterize the labor market.  One important reason for
these findings is that women, as a group, demonstrate great variability in
their work patterns.  Although women, on average, leave the labor force
to bear and care for children more frequently than their male counterparts,
many women do not take any such leave, and for the majority of women
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
29  See infra text accompanying notes 83-88.
30  At this point, I should note that I use the term choice guardedly and here want
to bracket the discussion of how we ought to describe the choices women make given their
limited opportunities and the effects of social conditioning.  This is an issue I take up in
section I.B.  infra.       
31  See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Swimming Upstream: Trends in
the Gender Wage Differential in the 1980s, 15 J. OF LABOR ECONOMICS 1, 31 (1997)
(finding that an increase in skills, experience and occupational status explained a large
portion of the decrease in the gender gap); Linda Datcher Loury, The Gender Earnings
Gap Among College Educated Workers, 50 INDUS. & LABOR REL. RVW. 580, 590-91
(1997) (finding an increase in the market price of women's skills which reflects a decrease
in discrimination); Kevin Murphy & Finis Welch, Industrial Change and the Rising
Importance of Skill, at 101-32, in UNEVEN TIDES: RISING INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (S.
DANZIGER & P. GOTTSCHALK, EDS., 1993) (finding growth in market price of women's
skills explained decrease in wage gap).      
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who do, their leave is quite short, too short as it turns out to explain the
wage and career penalties that are being exacted.29  Rather than women's
actual labor market experiences, the better explanation for the failure to
break the existing patterns appears to lie with the employer's perceptions
of women's attachment to the labor force.  This expectation or perception,
is generally referred to as statistical discrimination, though as I  hope to
demonstrate a form of discrimination that ought not to be treated as
rational, as it generally is, but instead should more often be treated as
unlawful discrimination.  These issues will be discussed in more detail
below.30    
A.  The Human Capital Explanation.          
   The significant decrease in the wage gap that occurred in the
1980s is often attributed to improvement in women's education and,
experience, what are defined as human capital factors, as well as to a
reduction in levels of discrimination.31  Human capital explanations
suggest that gender differences in job placement and advancement arise
from differences in productivity acquired through education, labor force
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
32  For the classic articulation of this theory see GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN
CAPITAL (2d ed. 1981). 
33  See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in Modern Society: A
Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 971, 978
(1995); Posner, supra note26; Cass Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF. L.
REV. 751, 758-60 (1991); Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: is
There A Future for Egalitarian Marriage?  84 VA. L. REV. 509, 546-48, 602-11 (1998). 
34  Of course, our common sense also tells us that the quality of the investments
matters tremendously, hence the importance placed on grades.  See McKinley Blackburn &
David Neumark, Omitted-Ability Bias and the Increase in the Return to Schooling, 11 J.
OF LABOR ECON. 521 (1993) (demonstrating returns to schooling significant primarily for
those who obtain relatively high levels of academic achievement).  However, these
qualitative issues are very difficult to measure because the necessary data are often
lacking.  
35  See BLAU ET AL., supra note 20, at 189-90 (finding that education and
experience explain only one-third of gap excluding occupational component); GOLDIN,
supra note 23, at 105 (canvassing studies ranging from 44-74%); Marini & Fan, supra
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experience, and job tenure.32  This theory, despite its now well-
documented empirical shortcomings, has had unusually powerful
explanatory force within law, in large measure because it seems to accord
so closely with widely accepted notions of common sense.33  From a
young age, the importance of education is impressed upon us, and training
and work experience are generally relevant to an employer's labor market
decisions, in particular to their wage setting functions.34  Investing in
education and experience are two ways in which we seek to enhance our
values on the labor market.
1.  Education, Experience and Training.
   Despite this common sense approach, an impressive volume of
empirical studies have firmly established that the human capital theory
offers but a partial explanation for the gender wage gap.  Indeed, the
general consensus is that human capital factors explain at most about one
third to one half of the pay differentials between men and women –  not
an insubstantial amount, but far from a complete explanation either.35  The
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note 22, at 590 ("In studies based on samples of individuals of diverse ages, at most about
half of the gender gap in wages is associated with mean differences in human capital
between in the sexes -- and in some studies it is considerably less."); Paul Schumann,
Dennis A. Ahlburg & Christine Brown Mahoney, The Effect of Human Capital and Job
Characteristics on Pay, 29 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 481, 499 (1994) (finding that
human capital and job characteristics together explained 50% of surveyed sample).   
36 William T. Bielby & Denise D. Bielby, Cumulative Versus Continuous
Disadvantage in an Unstructured Labor Market, at 223-25, in GENDER INEQUALITY AT
WORK (Jerry A. Jacobs ed. 1995) (finding wage gap of 25% for female television writers
holding human capital factors constant); June O’Neill & Solomon Polachek, Why the
Gender Gap in Wages Narrowed in the 1980s, 11 J. OF LABOR ECON. 205, 209 (1993)
(“the narrowing in the gender gap in earnings in the 1980s to a large extent was caused by
a narrowing in the gender gap in experience”).   
37  See SPAIN & BIANCHI, supra note 22, at 59.  In 1998, 29% of women aged 25
to 29 had completed college, compared to 26% of men.  See UNITED STATES CENSUS
BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES at Table 3 (MAR. 1999).   
Some of the changes in women’s educational attainment are the result of women's greater
attendance at community colleges along with substantial numbers of older women
returning to school, both of which are likely to offer relatively lower payoffs in the market
place.
38   SPAIN & BIANCHI, supra note 22, at 63.  These numbers represent sharp gains
from the 1970s when women received 27.8% of biology and 37.4% of mathematics
degrees.  Id.  There were also significant improvements at the graduate levels:  women
received 51.0% of Master's degrees and 35.4% of Doctorates in biology, and 40.1% of the
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reasons for the theory's limited explanatory power are generally twofold.
   First, women have sharply narrowed the gaps in education and
experience, and have, in fact, narrowed the gap to a far greater extent than
is reflected in the wage ratio, which suggests that something other than
human capital factors are at work.36  This is particularly true with respect
to education where by the 1980s women matched men's college
attendance rates, and by 1990 women constituted 54 percent of the
college student body.37  Women also substantially narrowed the gap in
fields of study, an issue that had long been thought to account for much
of the earnings inequality.  By 1990, women accounted for 50 percent of
the biology  and 46.2 percent of the mathematics majors,38 and a survey
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Master's degrees and 17.8% of the Doctorates in Mathematics.  Id.  As the authors
explain:  "In 1964, approximately one-half of women college students would have had to
change majors to achieve the distribution of men's majors.  By 1984, only one-third of
women would have had to change majors to match men's majors."  Id.  Barry Gerhart has
documented the role college majors play in explaining the wage gap, though in his study
two engineering majors (mechanical and electrical) accounted for a large portion of the
explanation.  See Barry Gerhart, Gender Differences in Current and Starting Salaries:
the Role of Performance, College Major, and Job Title, 43 INDUS. & LABOR REL. RVW.
418, 426 (1990).  Despite the advances noted above, it appears that the trend toward
greater integration of majors may have stalled.  See Jerry A. Jacobs, Gender and
Academic Specialties: Trends Among Recipients of College Degrees in the 1980s, 68
SOCIOLOGY OF EDUC. 81, 86 (1995) (“the trend toward lowers legels of segregation across
majors that was evident in the early 1980s slowed or reversed direction in the lates
1980s.”).   
39  See Catherine J. Weinberger, Race and Gender Wage Gaps in the Market for
Recent College Graduates, 37 INDUS. RELATIONS 67, 82 (1998) (“The analysis shows
clearly that among recent college graduates white women . . . black women . . . and Asian
women all face the same 10 to 15 percent wage disadvantage relative to white men with the
same type and quality of college education.”).  Although field of study is often thought to
provide substantial explanatory power, not surprisingly, the primary effect of a college
major is to determine in which industry the person is likely to work.  Therefore, it is often
difficult to know whether the major is tied to wages or whether the observed wages are a
product of the industry.  See Charles Brown & Mary Corcoran, Sex-Based Differences in
School Content and the Male-Female Wage Gap, 15 J. LABOR ECON. 431, 460 (1997). 
In this way, field of study is closely related to the issue of occupational segregation and
choice, discussed in more detail infra at --.     
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of 1985 graduates found that after controlling for major, grades and
quality of education, even recent female college graduates experienced a
10 to 15 percent wage disadvantage.39
   In the last two decades, women have likewise reduced the
disparities in work experience, especially among more recent entrants to
the workforce.  For example, in 1998, men aged 25 to 34 had a median
tenure of 2.8 years with their current employer whereas for women the
median was 2.5 years, and it appears that a significant portion of the
decline in the wage gap is attributable to the narrowing of differences in
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40   See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE
TENURE IN 1998, at Table 1 (1998).  The differences were greater with older workers,
where men aged 45 to 54 had a medain tenure of 9.4 years compared to women’s median
of 7.2 years. Id.  See also Francine D. Blau, Trends in Well-Being of American Women,
1970-1995, 36 J. OF ECON. LIT. 112, 119 (1998) (noting that “among full-time workers,
the gender difference in full-time experience declined from 7.5 years in 1979 to 4.6 years
in 1988"); Allison J. Wellington, Changes in The Male/Female Wage Gap, 1976-85, 28 J.
HUMAN RESOURCES 393, 395 (1993) (concluding that changes in market experience for
women explained significant portion of reduction in wage gap).  There is also evidence that
early labor market experience is only mildly significant to later wages, as many young
employees explore various jobs in their early careers.  See Rosella Gardecki & David
Neumark, Order from Chaos? The Effects of Early Labor Market Experiences on Adult
Labor Market Outcomes, 51 INDUS. & LABOR REL. RVW. 299 (1998).  The importance of
early job attachment appears somewhat more important for women who generally have a
greater need to signal their workplace commitment to employers.  Id. at 319.
41  See Anne Beeson Royalty, The Effects of Job Turnover on the Training of Men
and Women, 49 INDUS. & LABOR REL. RVW. 513, 520 (1996) (finding that job turnover
rates may explain as much as 25% of the training differential).  Even these results,
however, leave three-quarters of the training differential unexplained by job turnover rates.
42  A 1995 Survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics found that men
averaged 48 hours of training during the six months of the survey period, while women
averaged 42 hours.  See U. S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1995
SURVEY OF EMPLOYER PROVIDED TRAINING — EMPLOYEE RESULTS 3 (1996).  However,
the report concluded that this difference was too small “relative to the precision of
estimates” to conclude that the difference was meaningful.  Id; see also Jonathan R. Veum,
Training Among Young Adults: Who, What Kind, and For How Long? 116 MONTHLY
LABOR RVW. 27 (1993) (discussing lower training rates among women).  Other surveys
indicate that women’s investments in training are comparable to men’s, though the
duration of their training appears to be shorter.  See Mark A. Lowenstein & James R.
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experience.40   
   Like education and experience, job training can also enhance
one’s value on the labor market, especially job training that is general
rather than specific to a particular firm, and the human capital theorists
suggest that women are likely to invest less in job training because that
training has a lower value for women because of the likelihood that they
may spend significant time out of the labor market.41  There is indeed
evidence that women receive less job training than men, though the
evidence is not overwhelming,42 and often difficult to interpret. For
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Speltzer, Delayed Formal On-the-Job Training, 51 INDUS. & LABOR REL. RVW. 82, 95
n.20 (1997).    
43  A study involving Canadian women provides some evidence to refute the notion
that women accumulate less firm-specific human capital than men because, in the study,
women tended to suffer greater wage loss following a job displacement than men.  See
Thomas F. Crossley, Stephen G. Jones, & Peter Kuhn, Gender Differences in
Displacement Cost: Evidence and Implications, 29 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 461, 474-
77 (1994).  This finding is inconsistent with the human capital story, which suggests that
women invest less in training so that they will not suffer as much of a penalty when they
leave a job.  Alternatively, employers might provide less training to women because of
their perceived shorter work life.  See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S.SMITH,
MODERN LABOR ECON. 308 (6TH ED. 1997).  Another fact that conflicts with the human
capital story is that one would expect women to receive a higher wage early in their career
when men are devoting more time, and presumably receiving lower wages, in training.  See
BLAU ET AL., supra note 20, at 181-83.  There is, however, no evidence to support this
notion.       
44  See John M. Barron, Dan A. Black, & Mark A. Lowenstein, Gender
Differences in Training, Capital and Wages, 28 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 343, 361
(1993).  Interestingly, training that is firm specific tends to improve women’s job tenure
much more significantly than it does for men.  See Lisa M. Lynch, The Role of Off-the-Job
vs. On-the-Job Training for the Mobility of Women Workers, 81 AMER. ECON. RVW.
PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 151, 155 (1991).
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example, the standard neoclassical argument is that the difference in
training reflects women’s lower investments has less force when the
employer provides the training, as is true with most forms of training,
unless women are opting out of the training on a voluntary basis, or
employers are discriminatorily applying their training opportunities.43  It
has also been suggested that the difference in training is primarily due to
the kind of jobs women occupy, which tend to offer less training
opportunities than the jobs of their  male counterparts.44  As such, it is
difficult to know how to interpret the differential training, other than
perhaps to suggest that it does not appear to provide strong explanatory
power.  Reviewing the evidence relating to human capital investments 
two economists recently concluded, "[I]t is clear that closing the human
capital gap between men and women, with regard to skill acquisition,
training, and particularly work experience . . . will not by itself close the
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45  Judith Fields & Edward N. Wolff, Interindustry Wage Differentials and the
Gender Wage Gap, 49 INDUS. & LABOR REL. RVW. 105, 118-19 (1995).  As discussed
below, the authors of the study found that women were concentrated in lower paying
industries and that this distribution explained about one-third of the wage gap.  Id. at 116-
18.   
46  See, e.g., Barbara Stanek Kilbourne et al, Returns to Skill, Compensating
Differentials, and Gender Bias: Effects of Occupational Characteristics on Wages of
White Women and Men, 100 AMER. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 689, 704 (1994) (finding experience
but not education explained significant portion of wage gap);  Linda K. Stroh et al, All the
Right Stuff: A Comparison of Female and Male Managers' Career Progression, 77 J. OF
APPLIED PSYCH. 251, 255 (1992) ("Education was the only human capital variable that
predicted salary progression."); James L. Medoff & Katherine G. Abraham, Are Those
Paid More Really More Productive? The Case of Experience, 16 J. OF HUMAN
RESOURCES 186, 215 (1981) (concluding that only "a small fraction of experience-
earnings differentials can be explained by experience productivity differentials."); Andrew
Weiss, Human Capital vs. Signaling Explanations of Wages, 9 J. OF ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 133, 141 (1995) (finding that "test scores, and measurable learning in
secondary school can explain at most one-quarter" of the increased earnings associated
with high school degree).
47  For discussions relating to the difficulty of measuring productivity see
EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 44, at 382-83 (discussing difficulty of measuring many
qualitative aspects of performance); Hae-shin Hwang, W. Robert Reed & Carlton
Hubbard, Compensating Wage Differentials and Unobserved Productivity, 100 J. OF
POL. ECON. 835, 843 (1992) (“[W]e suggest that 30-50 percent of total worker
productivity variance remains uncaptured by the usual set of labor market productivity
variables – variables such as age, labor market experience, and formal schooling.”);
Medoff & Abraham, supra note 46, at 210-15 (questioning the relationship between pay
and productivity).    
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gender wage gap."45  
   A second important limitation to the human capital explanation
is that there is now substantial empirical documentation that the
characteristics typically treated as human capital factors do not fully
explain an employer's wage setting process and therefore do not account
for significant portions of wage functions.46  Some of the lack of
explanatory power is due to the sheer difficulty of measuring individual
productivity for which education, experience and training are generally
used as rough proxies,47 while still other measurement issues arise due to
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48  For example, contrary to what might be expected under neoclassical models,
employers are reluctant to lower wages when faced with slack demand and instead prefer
to layoff workers.  Additionally, it often appears that employers pay more than is
necessary to attract qualified employees.  For discussions of these and other issues relating
to the particularities of the labor market see ROBERT M. SOLOW, THE LABOR MARKET AS
A SOCIAL INSTITUTION (1990); Jeremy I. Bulow & Lawrence H. Summers, A Theory of
Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination, and
Keynesian Unemployment, 4 J. LAB. ECON. 376 (1986); Andrew Weiss, supra note 46;
Janet L. Yellen, Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment, 74 AMER. ECON. RVW. 200
(1984).  It is also well-established that large employers tend to pay higher wages than
smaller employers.  See Walter Y. Oi, Employment Relations in Dual Labor Markets
(“It’s Nice Work If You Can Get It”), 8 J. OF LABOR ECON. S124 (1990) (discussing
effect of employer size on wages).
49  An important recent study using data from 1989 found that women were
somewhat less productive than men but that “women’s wages fall short of men by
considerably more than can be explained by their lower marginal productivity.”  Judith K.
Hellerstein, David Neumark & Kenneth Troske, Wages, Productivity, and Worker
Characteristics: Evidence from Plant-Level Production Functions and Wage Equations,
17 J. OF LABOR ECON. 409, 433 (1999).  An earlier study that also utilized direct measures
of productivity found that women had “comparable productivity” but “much lower wages”
than men.  See Harry J. Holzer, The Determinants of Employee Productivity & Earnings,
29 INDUS. RELATIONS 403, 415 (1990).     
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peculiarities of the labor market that are still not well understood.48   The
few studies that have been able to measure productivity directly have
concluded that the wage gap cannot be attributed to productivity
differences between men and women.49 
2.  The Question of Hours.
   Education, experience and training constitute the characteristics
that are typically considered in human capital explanations, but another
possible explanation for why men are paid more than women, even for
similar jobs, may be tied to their availability to work longer hours, an
availability that may have to do with child rearing rather than the
circumstances surrounding the fear that women will exit the labor market
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50  See Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable
Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1780-81 (1986) (arguing that the difference in hours
worked between men and women offers significant explanatory power). 
51   For an argument that unobserved characteristics, such as motivation, explain a
substantial portion of the wage gap see Moon-Kak Kim & Soloman W. Polachek, Panel
Estimates of Male-Female Earnings Functions, 29 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 406 (1994). 
As noted in the text, by its very nature these characteristics are difficult to measure or
model and thus not easy to assign any causal role without a substantial element of
speculation.  
52  It is not clear that a willingness to work longer hours ought to result in higher
hourly wages, where there also exists a significant wage gap.  See note 20 supra. 
However, employers may be willing to pay higher hourly wages to those employees who
are willing to take on longer hours for a variety of reasons, including the perception that
these employees are harder workers. 
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when they have children.50  Under this theory, women may not be able to
work as many hours, put in the necessary overtime for example, or they
may be less attentive at work due to concerns about their children, and
these differences are reflected in lower wages.  This is a complicated and
controversial issue on which the data are not likely to provide a
convincing explanation because  effort levels, or dedication, are the kind
of workplace intangibles that are difficult to quantify, and therefore
difficult to assess other than through speculation.51  However, the data that
are available suggest that this explanation fails to demonstrate that the pay
differentials relate to productivity differences.
   One potential measure of effort or dedication would be hours
worked, under the notion that the more dedicated employees work longer
hours.  This is, of course, an imperfect measure because the most
dedicated employees may be the most efficient (saving employers in
hourly compensation).52  To the extent hours matter, men do spend more
time in the labor market than women, but the differences are not
particularly significant and do not explain the observed pay differentials.
Recent data from the Current Population Survey indicates that in 1997
thirty percent of men and fifteen percent of women usually worked more
than 44 hours in a week, while only one in ten men and one in thirty
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53  See Daniel Hecker, How Hours of Work Affect Occupational Earnings, 121
MONTHLY LABOR RVW. 8, 9 (1998).   
54  At the managerial level, 50% of men and 30% of women worked more than 44
hours in a week.  Id. 
55  Id. at 10.  It is easy for lawyers, who work unusually long hours, to
overemphasize the importance of long hours, and indeed lawyers have been quick to
suggest to me that a disparity in hours was likely to offer a significant explanation. 
Interestingly among lawyers, the average hours worked for men and women were roughly
the same, although a larger percentage of men (25% compared to 18% of women) worked
more than 55 hours a week.  Id. at 11-12.               
56  Id. 
57  Relying on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the period 1979-
89, Barry Bluestone and Stephen Rose concluded, “As a general rule . . . there has been a
slight reduction in men’s work hours and a large increase in women’s hours.”  Barry
Bluestone & Stephen Rose, Overworked and Underemployed, THE AMER. PROSPECT 58,
64 (Mar.-Apr. 1997).  Women also constitute the majority of employees who have taken
on second jobs during the last decade.  Id. at 59 (noting that in 1995, 6.4% of the
workforce reported working second jobs and that “[v]irtually all of this increase has
occurred among women, who now represent nearly half of all multiple job holders.”).  The
question whether hours are increasing for workers and the importance of working longer
hours is a controversial and hotly debated issue.  The common perception is certainly that
people are working longer hours to either get ahead or stay even.  See, e.g., JULIET B.
SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE (1993);
Louis Uchitelle, At the Desk, Off the Clock and Below Statistical Radar, N. Y. TIMES,
July 18, 1999, at Sec. 3-4, p.6.  Detailed time-use studies conducted at the University of
Maryland, however, show that people are working less than they once did and actually
have more free time than they generally believe.  See JOHN P. ROBINSON, TIME FOR LIFE:
THE SURPRISING WAYS AMERICANS USE THEIR TIME (1997).  As a result, probably the
best we can say is that the data compiled by the government indicate that hours have
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women worked more than 54 hours a week.53  Excessive hours were
considerably more likely at the managerial level than in nonsupervisory
positions,54 and on average men worked 44 hours per week while women
worked 41 hours.55  Interestingly, the wage premium paid for working
extended hours was marginally higher for women than men,56 suggesting
that women can benefit by taking on longer hours, and the data also
suggest that women have increased their work hours in recent years more
than their male counterparts.57   
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remained stable during the last decade, and there is as yet no conclusive evidence that men
are working more than women at a rate that might explain the pay gap. 
58  See, e.g., FRANCINE M. DEUTSCH, HALVING IT ALL: HOW EQUALLY SHARED
PARENTING WORKS 6 (1999) (noting that in three fourths of families that did not share
work equally women worked more total hours than their husbands); Joni Hersch,
Economics of Housework, in WOMEN AND WORK: A HANDBOOK 83, at 84-85 (Paula J.
Dubeck & Kathryn Borman eds. 1996) (“Although men average more hours than women
in paid employment, full-time employed women spend more total time on housework and
market work than men do.”).  A study of dual earner families based on a 1986-87 national
sample found that women worked a total of 68.8 hours a week compared to 63.4 hours for
men.  See Harriet B. Presser, Employment Schedules Among Dual Earner Spouses and
the Division of Household Labor By Gender, 59 AMER. SOCIOLOGICAL RVW. 348, 353
(1994).  These figures did not include childcare and therefore almost certainly
underestimated women’s hours.  Id.
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   Another aspect of the effort equation on which the data provide
some insight is the fact that women generally spend more time on
combined market and nonmarket work than men.58  This  suggests that
women may have more overall effort to expend than men, so that even if
women have more duties outside of the workplace, there is no particular
reason to believe that women would be unable to devote sufficient time
or energy to their job.  On the contrary, the perception that women do not
have comparable time or energy for labor market activities may reflect a
pervasive stereotype, one that may hinder women’s advancement in the
workplace. 
3.  Marriage, Children and Housework. 
   The above survey demonstrates that the traditional human capital
story falls short as a means of explaining the persistence of the wage gap.
Although employers generally take education, experience and training into
account in making hiring decisions and determining pay scales, they seem
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59  It is also worth noting that occasionally, employers set policies with little
concern for their rationality.  For example, a study of a large insurance company found
that receiving an outstanding performance rating actually had a negative effect on
promotion.  See Heidi L. Hartman, Internal Labor Markets and Gender: A Case Study of
Promotion, at 80, in GENDER IN THE WORKPLACE (Clair Brown and Joseph Pechman eds.,
1987).  In invalidating a program that denied women their accrued seniority while on
leave, the Supreme Court, in an opnion written by Justice Rehnquist, noted that the policy
appeared economically unwise in that "inexperienced employees are favored over
experienced employees.  . .  ."  Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 n.5 (1977).  
60 See, e.g., Marcia Bellos, The Effects of Marital Status & Wives' Employment
on the Salaries of Faculty Men: The (House)Wife Bonus, 6 GENDER & SOCIETY 609
(1992) (discussing marital bonus for male faculty members); Joni Hersch, Male-Female
Differences in Hourly Wages: The Role of Human Capital, Working Conditions, &
Housework, 44 INDUS. & LABOR REL. RVW. 746, 752 (1991) ("Consistent with other
studies, being married is positively related to men's earnings and not significant for
women."); Martha S. Hill, The Wage Effects of Marital Status & Children, 14 J. OF
HUMAN RESOURCES 549 (1979) (documenting male wage premium for marriage); Jerry A.
Jacobs, Women’s Entry Into Mgt.: Trends In Earnings, Authority & Values Among
Salaried Managers, 37 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 282, 296 (1992) (finding marital status had
negative effect on wages of female managers but positive effect for men); Eng Seng Loh,
Productivity Differences and the Marriage Wage Premium for White Males, 31 J. OF
HUMAN RESOURCES 566 (1996) (surveying literature on male wage premium).  One recent
study suggests that the male wage premium declined significantly in the 1980s.  See
Jeffrey S. Gray, The Fall in Men's Return to Marriage: Declining Productivity or
Changing Selection? 32 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 481, 491 (1997) (finding that "the
return to marriage for men fell by 45% over the 1980s."). 
61  Hill, supra note 60, at 558;  Sanders Korenman & David Neumark, Marriage,
Motherhood & Wages, 27 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 233 (1992) (finding that marriage did
not affect wage rates for women but presence of children did); Jane Waldfogel, supra note
7, at 147 (noting that “[h]aving children had positive or no effects for men, but very
strongly negative effects for women . . .”).
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to take other factors into account as well.59 Two such factors that appear
to be considered by employers, and valued differentially for men and
women, are marriage and children.  As has been well documented, for
men, marriage is typically rewarded with a wage premium, while for
women marriage has either a neutral or modestly negative effect on their
wages.60  Having children, on the other hand, is generally a negative factor
in the labor market for women, though neutral for men.61   
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
62  See Lawrence Kenny, The Accumulation of Human Capital During Marriage
by Males, 21 ECON. INQUIRY 223 (1983) (suggesting that marriage contributes to men's
human capital); Sanders Korenman & David Neumark, Does Marriage Really Make Men
More Productive?, 26 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 282 (1991) (suggesting marriage does
increase productivity for men).
63  At first blush, it may appear that, if true, this explanation ought also to apply to
women, and one recent study found a marriage wage premium related to productivity
differences for both men and women.  See Hellerstein et al., supra note 49, at 443
(“Workers who have ever been married are paid more than never-married workers, and the
wage premium they receive reflects corresponding productivity premium.”).  It is also
possible that the desirable male workers are marrying women who are more likely to help
out at home than devote themselves to the workforce.  Ultimately, this is an empirical
question on which I have seen no data.  However, given that highly educated men tend to
marry highly educated women – a sign of investment in the labor market – this appears
unlikely.  See JERRY JACOBS, REVOLVING DOOR 44 (1989) (“[O]n average, highly
educated men marry women who are themselves well educated.”).    
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   These factors –  marriage and children –  might be related to an
employee's productivity, as the difference being married makes to wages
could be explained by the contributions a marriage might offer toward the
wage earning potential of men and women.  Indeed, a number of
commentators have suggested that marriage makes men more productive
in the workplace, although even among those who adopt this position it
is often uncertain how the increase comes about.62 One explanation
suggests that after marrying, men tend to settle down and become more
serious about their work life (or devote less time to housework), which
could contribute to increased productivity in the workplace.  For men,
marriage may also be seen as a proxy for some desirable characteristic,
as it may be that better workers are more likely to be married.63
   The argument that marriage either makes men more productive,
or is a useful proxy for some unmeasurable productivity component, fails
to offer a convincing explanation upon even a cursory evaluation.  The
idea that marriage is a helpful proxy for labor market success ignores the
high number of marriages that fail, and it would surely be fanciful to think
that employers can foresee which marriages were most likely to last.  If
they could make this determination, then marriage would no longer be the
proxy, but the additional characteristic that determines whether the
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64  Eng Seng Loh, supra note 60, at 571 (demonstrating that wage premium not
reflected among self-employed men); see also Jeffrey S. Gray, supra note 60, at 493-4
(1997) (finding that marriage decreases productivity for men); McKinley Blackburn &
Sanders Korenman, The Declining Marital-Status Earnings Differential, 7 J. OF
POPULATION ECON. 249 (1994) (documenting decrease in returns to marriage with years
married).
65  See Chloe E. Bird, supra note 4, at 38 (reporting that married men in survey
performed 90 minutes more housework a week than single men); David H. Demo & Alan
C. Acock, Family Diversity and the Division of Domestic Labor, 42 FAMILY RELATIONS
323, 330 (1993) (finding that married men worked approximately 5 hours more per week
than unmarried men).  
66  There is some evidence that marriage is treated more positively for black
women than for white women.  See Barbara Kilbourne et al., Effects of Individual,
Occupational, and Industrial Characteristics on Earnings: Intersections of Race and
Gender, 72 SOCIAL FORCES 1149, 1165 (1994) (“In contrast to the nonsignificant effect of
marital status for white women . . . black women’s earnings significantly increase by about
3% upon marriage.”).  The wage premium black women receive upon marriage, however,
falls far short of that received by black and white men.  See id. (finding a wage premium
of 13% for white men and 9% for black men.).   
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marriage will succeed would be the key factor for employers to consider.
Conceivably, the simple fact of marriage, not the success of that marriage,
provides an important signal for an employer regarding future labor
market success, but if this were so “marriage” would then be a proxy for
some productivity component and it is difficult to understand exactly how
the act of marrying provides significant evidence to an employer,
particularly independent of the success of that marriage.  On the contrary,
several recent studies suggest that in many ways marriage may lead to
lower productivity for men; for example, married self-employed men earn
less than single self-employed men, which belies the notion that something
about marriage contributes positively to the workplace for men but not for
women,64 and married men actually perform a shade more housework than
single men.65   
   Nevertheless, while the rationale may not be fully understood or
supported by the data, marriage is clearly treated as a positive factor in the
workplace for men, whereas for women it proves considerably more
ambiguous and is more likely than not seen as a negative attribute.66  As
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67  It is important to emphasize that the wage differentials are not entirely steeped
in actual characteristics that are relevant to the workplace.  Sociologist Jane Waldfogel
recent comprehensive study on the effect of children on women’s wages concluded: “Even
after controlling for human capital, unobserved heterogeneity, and part-time job status . . 
there is still a 4 percent penalty for having one child and a nearly 12 percent penalty for
having two or more children.”  Jane Waldfogel, The Effect of Children on Women’s
Wages, 62 AMER. SOCIOLOGICAL RVW. 209, 215 (1997). 
68  Jessica Primoff Vistnes, Gender Differences in Days Lost from Work Due to
Illness, 50 INDUS. & LABOR RELATIONS RVW. 304, 319 (1997); see also J.P.Leigh, Sex
Differences in Absenteeism, 22 INDUS. REL. 349 (1983) (presence of  children under six
increased absences for women but not for men).  Recent data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics indicates that women aged 16 and over missed work at a rate that was nearly
twice as high as men, though they missed less than 3.0% of their work time on average. 
See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS Table 44, at 219 (1998) (women
had a loss worktime rate of 2.8% compared to the male rate of 1.5%).  The Bureau of
Labor Statistics measured loss work for the following reasons: own illness, injury, or
medical problems, child-care problems, other family or personal obligations, civic or
military duty, and maternity or paternity leave. 
69  Vistnes, supra note 68, at 316.  There was, however, an increase, though not
statistically significant, of missed days from work for men with children in day care, which
was presumably a sign that the man's wife worked and thus was less able to devote time to
caring for the children.  Id. at 318.  Women with children who opt for part-time work also
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discussed in more detail in the next section, the reason marriage often
carries negative connotations for women has to do with an employer’s
expectation that following marriage, women are likely to leave the
workforce for some period of time to have and to care for children.  In
addition to being married, having children also produces disparate effects
on the salaries of men and women, depressing those for women while
generally not affecting male salaries.  Here the salary differentials seem
to be based largely, though not entirely, on the actual experiences of men
and women, at least with respect to group averages, as women tend to
experience greater absences than men in the workplace when they have
young children.67  One recent study estimated that for women each
additional child under six years of age increased the probability of
absence from work by more than twenty-five percent although the actual
loss work time remains relatively low.68 In contrast,  having children at
home tends not to affect men’s absences.69   
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suffer a significant wage penalty, as is true for those who work part-time more generally. 
See Waldfogel, supra note 67, at 215 (finding a wage penalty of over 10 percent).
70  See Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, Housework, Fixed Effects and Wages of
Married Women, 32 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 285, 300-01 (1997).  This study was based
on a sample of more than 3500 individuals over a period ranging from 1979-87.  Id. at
289-90. 
71  Id. at 301.  The authors were puzzled by the gender specific wage penalty for
housework, and suggested the disparity may be a sign that employers discriminate against
women, but not men who devote substantial time to housework.  Id. at 304.  This
observation supports the role of statistical discrimination discussed more fully below.
72  Id. at 294.
73  Id. at 289-90.  In the sample, women averaged 19.2 hours of housework a week
while men averaged 6.77 hours.  Id.  In contrast to these figures, Kathleen Hall Jamieson
cites numerous studies indicating that men perform on average about 20% of household
tasks and devote one-third or less of time to children compared to  mothers.  See
KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, BEYOND THE DOUBLE BIND 62 (1995); see also Demo &
Acock, supra note 65, at 329 (finding that mothers spend between 40-44 hours per week
on household labor while husbands or partners averaged 13).  For a discussion of the
studies on housework see Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and
the Law, 91 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1996).  There is some evidence that the
gap in hours is decreasing, primarily as a result of women decreasing the number of hours
they devote to housework.  See Blau, supra note 40, at 151.  The disparities also vary
some by race as black men tend to have more egalitarian views regarding gender norms
and housework.  See Terri I. Orbach & Sandra L. Eyster, Division of Household Labor
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   It has likewise been demonstrated that time spent on housework
significantly depresses wages. Professors Joni Hersch and Leslie Stratton
recently documented that, for women, time spent on housework has a
strong negative effect on wages and may explain as much as ten percent
of the gender wage gap.70  Though less substantial, the effect on men's
wages was likewise statistically significant.71  Interestingly, the authors
found no significant effect on the wages of women who performed ten
hours or less of housework a week, an amount that is generally on par
with the level of most men.72  Not surprisingly, women in the study
engaged in approximately three times as much housework as men, an
estimate that is generally consistent with most previous studies, though
higher than some.73  These disparities persist even in dual earner couples
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Among Black and White Couples, 76 SOCIAL FORCES 301, 325 (1997)
74  See Sampson Lee Blair & Michael P. Johnson, Wives’ Perceptions of the
Fairness of the Division of Household Labor: The Intersection of Housework and
Ideology, 54 J. OF MARRIAGE & THE FAMILY 570, 575 (1992) (finding that nonemployed
wives performed four times as much housework as their employed spouses while employed
women did twice as much); Presser, supra note 58, at 353 (in sample women in dual-
earner families worked twice as many hours in the home as men).  
75   See BECKER, supra note 32; Gary Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of Time,
75 ECON. J. 493 (1965).  Becker's argument is succinctly set forth in Gary S. Becker,
Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J. OF LABOR ECONOMICS S33
(1985).  For additional discussions along these lines  see Solomon William Polachek,
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where women still perform approximately twice as much housework as
their spouses.74   Thus, it seems clear that marriage and children
negatively affect women’s wages and career paths, and that the penalties
exacted are not all directly tied to actual differences in productivity but are
more likely steeped in perceptions and expectations about women’s
workforce participation.      
4.  Women’s Labor Force Attachment.
   As just noted, the greater time that women spend on their children
and on housework explains a portion of the gender wage gap.  Yet, just
as was true with the traditional human capital factors, the observed
differences do not fully explain the gap, and something else appears to be
responsible for the persistence of gender labor market inequalities.  That
missing factor, which may also be implicit in the marriage and child
penalties, is generally thought to be women's labor market behavior.  In
particular, women’s supposed tendency to exit the labor market for
periods of time to have and to care for children, as well as their choices
about careers, is generally said to explain why women end up in different
jobs than men or are paid significantly less than their male counterparts.
For example, given their disproportionate responsibility for child rearing,
women may choose jobs that offer greater flexibility or that require
comparatively less work effort, as Gary Becker hypothesized many years
ago.75  Similarly, women may be trading lower wages for higher
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supra note -- (suggesting that women's labor force attachment accounts for occupational
differences); Posner, supra note 26, at 1330 (assuming that women are attracted to jobs
requiring less human capital).
74  See, e.g., Randall K. Filer, Male-Female Wage Differences: The Importance
of Compensating Differentials, 38 INDUS. & LABOR REL. RVW. 426 (1985)
(hypothesizing that women trade benefits for other desirable workplace characteristics);
Paul Weiler, supra note 50, at 1778 (arguing that working conditions can help explain
wage gap).
75  See, e.g., Sonalde Desai & Linda J. Waite, Women's Employment During
Pregnancy and After the First Birth: Occupational Characteristics and Work
Commitment, 56 AMER. SOCIOLOGICAL RVW. 551, 563 (1991) ("[W]e find no effect of the
sex composition of the occupation, which could . . . signify that the sex composition of the
occupation has no influence on the employment of pregnant women and new mothers."). 
76  DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, GENDER & RACIAL INEQUALITY AT WORK 50
(1993).  
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workplace benefits because they may have more to gain from generous
health insurance or leave policies.74
   Again, like the closely related human capital theory, these ideas
offer more intuitive than explanatory power.  A number of recent studies
have demonstrated that the sex composition of the particular job does not
explain women's employment behavior, which suggests that women are
not choosing jobs or occupations that necessarily facilitate more flexible
work schedules.75  If the theory were true, if for example women were
choosing jobs that facilitated child rearing, one would expect to find
women concentrated in occupations that require less effort or for which
on the job training was comparatively less important because women
would then have more time to spend on their home life and would also
have less invested in the workplace, making it less costly to move in and
out of the workforce.  However, based on his exhaustive analysis of data
from North Carolina, Professor Donald Tomaskovic-Devey recently
concluded, "It is striking that neither being married and having young
children nor working part-time affects whether women or men choose sex-
segregated employment."76  Mary Becker likewise observed some years
ago: "Women with less continuous employment experience are about as
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77  Mary E. Becker, Barriers Facing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the
Need for Additional Remedies: A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 934,
934-35 (1986).  See also Paula England, The Failure of Human Capital Theory to
Explain Occupational Sex Segregation, 17 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 358, 369 (1982)
(documenting that “women with continuous employment histories are no less apt than
other women to be in predominantly female occupations.”)  
78  See Jerry A. Jacobs & Ronnie Steinberg, Further Evidence on Compensating
Differentials and the Gender Gap in Wages, at 102, in GENDER INEQUALITY AT WORK
(Jerry A. Jacobs ed. 1995) ("Survey data suggest that working women rank income as high
as men do on a list of factors for choosing a job."); Margaret Mooney Marini et al.,
Gender and Job Values, 69 SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 49 (1996) (finding that young
men and women valued rewards of work similarly).  A study involving business majors at
the University of Illinois found that although men and women both valued salary highly,
men seemed to place more weight on salary, while for women career advancement was
slightly more important than salary.  See Francine D. Blau & Marianne A. Ferber, Career
Plans and Expectations of Young Women and Men, 26  J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 581,
590 (1991) (“The same three characteristics are rated highest by both groups . . . salary,
opportunity for advancement, and intellectual challenge, though men do opt more often for
the first two, women for the third.”).        
79 See TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 76, at 51 ("Women are not selecting
typically female jobs to trade higher starting wages for lower wage depreciation when they
leave the labor force to have and to care for children."); Sarah Beth Estes & Jennifer L.
Glass, Job Changes Following Childbirth: Are Women Trading Compensation for
Family-Responsive Work Conditions?, 23 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 405, 424 (1996)
(“[T]he quantitative analysis yields little evidence that accommodations are being
substituted for compensation in the job mobility of new mothers.”); Joni Hersch & Shelley
White-Means, Employer-Sponsored Health and Pension Benefits and the Gender/Race
Wage Gap, 74 SOCIAL SCI. Q. 851, 865 (1993) (finding that increased benefits do not
explain gender wage gap as women "still face a large compensation disadvantage relative
to white men."); Joni Hersch, Male-Female Differences in Hourly Wages: The Role of
Human Capital, Working Conditions, and Housework, 44 INDUS. & LABOR REL. RVW.
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likely to be in male fields as women with more continuous employment
experience, and the depreciation rates associated with temporary
withdrawal from the wage-labor market are not significantly higher for
male jobs than for female jobs."77
   Relatedly, women tend to rank income as highly in importance
among job characteristics as men,78 and the current data do not support
the theory that women are trading lower wages for higher benefits.79  As
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746, 757 (1991) (rejecting theory that women are choosing lower paying jobs because of
compensating factors because "[i]f women choose lower paying jobs because such jobs
provide non-wage compensation, such as pleasant working conditions, we would expect to
explain more of the wage gap by controlling for attributes of jobs."). 
80  See JOYCE P. JACOBSEN, THE ECONOMICS OF GENDER 55 (1994) (“It is clear
from surveys that women generally have fewer fringe benefits . . . available to them in
terms of total monetary value, partly because more women work part-time and partly
because the value of some fringe benefits is directly tied to earnings.”); William E. Even &
David A. Macpherson, Gender Differences in Pension, 29 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 555,
555-56 (1994) (“In the United States, 55 percent of male employees were enrolled in a
private pension plan in 1988, while only 45 percent of female employees were.”); 
Christine A. Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense to Talk About 'Women'? 1 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 15,24-25 (1991) (discussing disparity of benefits between men and women). 
81  A comprehensive study involving New York state data found that although men
worked in jobs with greater extreme working conditions, those conditions did not explain
the gender wage gap.  In fact the opposite was true as "workers suffer a wage penalty for
working in unattractive jobs."  Jerry A. Jacobs & Ronnie Steinberg, supra note 78, at 113-
14.  See also Kilbourne et al., supra note 46, at 704 (finding no support for notion that
men are in less desirable or more dangerous jobs as explanation for wage gap). 
82  Two facts illustrate this point: union members receive higher wages and
experience lower fatality rates than nonunion members, and wages tend to increase with
education while injury rates decrease.  For a comprehensive recent discussion of the issue
see Peter Dorman and Paul Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work
Revisited, 52 INDUS. & LABOR REL. RVW. 116 (1998).  One of the difficulties with
measuring wage premiums for dangerous work is that it is extremely difficult to capture
the full costs employees face, including the psychic costs such as pain and suffering they
may experience by working in dangerous jobs.  See THOMAS O. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A.
SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH ADMIN. 19 (1993).  As such, studies tend to underestimate the costs of the jobs
and therefore overstate the extent wages may compensate employees for dangerous work
conditions.     
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a group, women hold jobs that offer less generous benefits than those held
by men.80  Nor does it appear that the wage gap can be explained by the
fact that women choose less strenuous or dangerous jobs, or that they
demonstrate a preference for easier jobs.81  Although women tend to work
in jobs that have better safety records, the data increasingly demonstrate
that there is no wage premium for dangerous or undesirable jobs.82  
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83  See Joyce P. Jacobsen & Laurence M. Levin, Effects of Intermittent Labor
Force Attachment on Women’s Earnings, 118 MONTHLY LABOR RVW. 14, 16 (1995)
(noting that 85% of sampled women who left the labor force did so for family reasons);
Audrey Light & Manuelita Ureta, Early-Career Work Experience and Gender Wage
Differentials, 13 J. OF LABOR ECON. 121, 142 (1995) (largest group of women left for
personal reasons).
84  See Sonalde Desai & Linda J. Waite, supra note 75, 558 ("About 43 percent of
the new mothers in our sample had returned to work within three months of the birth of
their first child, and 69% had returned to work within 12 months."); Jutta M. Joesch,
Children and the Timing of Women’s Paid Work After Childbirth: A Further
Specification of the Relationship, 56 J. OF MARRIAGE & THE FAMILY 429, 437 (1994)
(finding that of the women surveyed 20% were out of work for 1 month or less and 53%
returned within six months); Jacob A. Klerman & Arleen Leibowitz, The Work-
Employment Distinction Among New Mothers, 29 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 277, 296
(1994) ("Today, about half of all women are back at work by the time their child is four
months old."). 
85  Sandra L. Hofferth, Effects of Public Private Policies on Working After
Childbirth, 23 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 378, 388 (1996).
86  These figures are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and are reported in
Howard Hayghe & Suzanne Bianchi, Married Mothers Work Patterns: The Job-Family
Compromise, 118 MONTHLY LABOR RVW. 6 (1994) (78% of women with school-age
children working in 1992).  
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   Some of these findings may run counter to our common
perceptions, although they appear more sensible when we look closely at
women's actual labor force behavior, which tends to be far more
consistent than is often assumed.  For women the most common reason to
leave the workforce is to have a child.83  Yet, following childbirth, the
majority of women return to work within six months, and between 40 and
65 percent return within three months.84  Reviewing data from the 1990
Child Care Survey, Sandra Hofferth found that 83 percent of those
mothers who worked during pregnancy returned to work within one
year.85  In general, most women return to work in some fashion –  as of
1992, nearly eighty percent of women with school age children were
working,86 and women with children were actually more likely to be in the
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87  Professor Julia Kirk Blackwelder indicates that as of 1989, 58.4% of women
with children under 6 were in the workforce, 73.2% of women with children between 6-18,
and 50.5% of women without children.  See JULIA KIRK BLACKWELDER, NOW HIRING:
THE FEMINIZATION OF WORK IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-95, at 195 (1997). 
88  See U. S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES, Table 6 (1999).  By all accounts, women as a group have
greatly increased their attachment to the labor force.  Kathryn Shaw, for example, notes
that the percentage of female workers defined as having a persistent labor force attachment
nearly doubled between the 1970s and the late 1980s.  See Kathryn Shaw, The Persistence
of Female Labor Supply, 29 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 348, 360 (1991).  
89  For a recent discussion of part-time work as it affects women see Ann
Bookman, Flexibility at What Price? The Costs of Part-Time Work for Women Workers,
52WASH. & LEE L. REV. 799 (1995). 
90   In 1998, 26.2% of women with children who worked were working part-time,
as measured by fewer than 35 hours a week. See U. S. DEPT. OF LABOR, supra note 2, at
Table 5.
91 See Edward J. McCaffery, Institutional Barriers to Women in the Workplace:
Equality of the Right Sort, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 289, 298 (1996).  McCaffery reports
that teenage women and those over 55 are the most likely to work part-time, though the
least likely to have children.  Id.  A survey of young workers based on 1993 data found
that 16% of female workers, and 4% of male workers worked fewer than 35 hours a week. 
See Marianne A. Ferber & Jane Waldfogel, The Long-Term Consequences of
Nontraditional Employment, 121 MONTHLY LABOR RVW. 3, 5 (1998).  Blau and her co-
authors suggest that as many as 27% of employed women worked less than 35 hours per
week in 1995.  See BLAU ET AL, supra note 20, at 319.   Although there appears to be a
widespread sense that part-time work is increasing, economist Henry Farber recently
concluded that there is "no evidence of a shift to part-time employment," and that the
percentage of part-time jobs among newly created jobs was roughly stable.  See Henry S.
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workforce than those without.87  Even women with very young children
have high participation rates; more than sixty percent of women with
children under two are working.88
   The figures discussed above include those working part-time,89
a category that is typically defined as those working fewer than thirty-five
hours.  Approximately one quarter of working women with children work
part-time, 90 and it is been estimated that fewer than 20 percent of women
older than twenty-five work part-time.91 Perhaps of more significance,
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Farber, Job Creation in the United States: Good Jobs or Bad? Working Paper, Indus.
Relations Sec., Princeton Univ., July 1997, at 25-28. 
92  See Rebecca M. Blank, Labor Market Dynamics and Part-Time Work, in
RESEARCH IN LABOR ECONOMICS 9 (Solomon W. Polacheck, ed. 1998).  Blank's study,
one of the most comprehensive to date on part-time work, analyzed fourteen years of data
for men and women employed between 1976 and 1989.   
93  Id. at 11.
94  Id. at 23 ("[P]ast labor market histories are crucially important in determining
current labor market location for adult women.").  It appears that the experience that
provides the least predictability is past part-time work, since part-time work can be a
transitional stage full-time work or to leaving the labor market.  Id.
95  See GOLDIN, supra note 23, at 32 ("Women who are in the labor force tend to
remain in for long periods of time, while those out of the labor force tend to remain out.");
Hofferth, supra note 85, at 391 (“Working during pregnancy is highly related to working
soon after birth.”); Joesch, supra note 84, at 436 (finding that the strongest indicator is
work status prior to birth); David Shapiro & Frank L. Mott, Long-Term Employment and
Earnings of Women in Relation to Employment Behavior Surrounding First Birth, 29 J.
OF HUMAN RESOURCES, 248, 272 (1994) (“This paper has shown that among the [sample]
women, employment behavior surrounding the first birth tends to be a significant
independent predictor of lifetime work experience.”).
-35-
those who worked full-time prior to having a child, tended to return to
full-time work after their leave; indeed, it appears relatively rare that
women (or men) move from full to part-time work.  In a recent
comprehensive survey of full and part-time workers, Professor Rebecca
Blank found that eighty-six percent of women who worked full-time in
one year, worked full-time the following year.92 Part-time workers were
less stable, as twenty percent moved to full-time work and fourteen
percent left the labor force altogether.93  These figures suggest that it is far
more common for women to move from part-time to full-time work than
vice versa, and that past labor market experience is crucially important to
determining current labor market location.94  In other words, women with
a continuous labor force attachment prior to childbirth tend to return to
that pattern within six months of the birth of the child.95  
   The timing of the workforce disruption, however, can play an
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96  Light & Ureta, supra note 83, at 142.  There are obviously exceptions to this
general pattern.  For example, a study of lawyers found that among men and women who
graduated from the same law school at the same time women earned about 7% less than
men initially but after 15 years they earned 40% less.  See Robert Wood, Mary E.
Corcoran & Paul N. Courant, Pay Differences Among the Highly Paid: The Male-Female
Earnings Gap in Lawyers’ Salaries, 11 J. OF LABOR ECON. 417 (1993).
97  Light & Ureta, supra note 83, at 144.
98  This is especially true among more recent entrants into the workforce.  Based
on a comprehensive analysis of longitudinal surveys, two economists have concluded,
“Assuming that the trends revealed here have been sustained, we can conclude that
employers would be completely unjustified in statistically discriminating against young
women because of their belief that they are more prone to job separation than their male
counterparts.”  Audrey Light & Manuelita Ureta, Panel Estimates of Male and Female
Job Turnover Behavior: Can Female Nonquitters Be Identified, 10 J. OF LABOR ECON.
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important role with respect to wages.  As the authors of a recent study on
leave patterns explain, "The general pattern . . . is that the gender wage
gap increases with experience over the first 10 years or so of the career
and then narrows appreciably."96  Women who are able to delay childbirth
for the first part of their career, are likely to be sufficiently well
established so as not to pay such a high penalty when they do have
children, though the delay may increase the chances of not having children
at all.  That said, this does not mean that the differentials are related to
productivity differences; indeed, the discussion above suggests they are
not. Rather, it appears that the most significant factor underlying the wage
disparities is that "men receive a larger return to their work efforts than do
women."97  This finding suggests that women are penalized not just for
their actual labor force disruptions but also based on other factors,
including the employer's perception that women are likely to leave the
workforce to have children, and for the perceived costs of that anticipated
work change, an issue that will be discussed in more detail under the topic
of statistical discrimination.
   Yet, based on the data reviewed above, it would be a mistake for
an employer to assume that women are likely to exit the labor force for
significant periods of time after they have a child, where significant is
defined as more than four to six months.98  At the same time, it is true that
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156, 179 (1992).
99  See GOLDIN, supra note 23, at 213 ("As long as women bear a disproportionate
burden in raising children, the labor market will reflect these differences."). 
100  Blank, supra note 92, at 2 and Table 1; U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS,, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS  172, Table 8 (Jan. 1995) (women
constitute 67.3% of part-time workers, and 68.9% of those defined as voluntary part-time
workers).
101  See Light & Ureta, supra note 83, at 128-29 (42% of men who left the
workforce did so to return to school, while 37% of women left for personal reasons.). 
There are, however, studies suggesting vastly different reasons for quitting.  For example,
in her book, Joyce Jacobsen discusses a survey which found that 73% of the women
surveyed quit to work for other companies, and only 7% quit to care for their children full-
time.  See JACOBSEN, supra note 80, at 146.  Moreover, as discussed in the next section,
the decision to leave the workforce when they have children is strongly influenced by both
gender norms and the effect of discrimination on opportunities and work experiences.        
103  A study tracing managers who had been relocated as part of a promotional
opportunity found that wage differentials persisted even when the male and female
managers were nearly identically situated.  The authors argued:  "[W]ith a sample such as
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the patterns for women differ significantly from those of men, and it is
these differences employers may be taking into account in their
employment decisions, and which likely contribute to (but do not fully
explain) the persistence of the wage gap.99  For example, two-thirds of
those who work part-time are women,100 and  for men, the most common
reason for leaving work for a sustained period of time tends to be to return
to school, while for women the most common reason is "personal", a term
that includes leaving the workforce to have children.101
   The more difficult question, one I discuss below, is whether these
group averages provide a reasonable basis for an employer’s decisions,
particularly when we consider that the women who are penalized the most
by the use of group averages are those women who do not follow the
expected pattern –  either those women who return to work earlier than
expected or those who do not have children but are nevertheless
disadvantaged because it is presumed that at some point in their career
they will.103  It may also be the case that women are simply choosing
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the present one, it is legitimate to question why there should be any sex differences in
career progression at all.  The female managers in this study had followed the traditional
male model of career advancement.  They had achieved high levels of education and had
stayed in the work force.  Many of them were less encumbered by family than were the
men.  Those with families were often the primary wage earners, had relocated their
families for their careers, and had not withdrawn from opportunities to relocate.  Yet,
doing all this had not been enough.  Following the traditional male career model had not
entirely eliminated the discrimination against them."  Stroh et al., supra note 46, at 257.
104  It is also worth noting that there is no indication that the loss work time, which
totals less than 3% of hours worked, is significant enough to adversely affect a worker’s
productivity to the extent employers might be warranted in taking it into account.
105  See, e.g., BLAU ET AL., supra note 20, at 196 (noting that occupational
categories account fors about 8% of pay gap with more detailed occupational categories
raising the level to 14-23%); William J. Carrington & Kenneth R. Troske, Gender
Segregation in Small Firms, 30 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 503, 523 (1995) (finding
significant gender segregation across small firms); Michael P. Kidd and Michael Shannon,
Does the Level of Occupational Aggregation Affect Estimates of the Gender Wage Gap?,
49 INDUS. & LABOR REL. RVW. 317, 326 (1997) (finding that broad occupational
categories underestimates gender wage differential); Trond Peterson & Laurie A. Morgan,
Separate and Unequal: Occupation-Establishment Sex Segregation and the Gender
Wage Gap, 101 AMER. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 329, 344 (1995) (based on data from the 1970s
and early 1980s finds that occupational segregation explained more than 80% of the wage
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different jobs based on their own preferences, which may differ from
men’s, an issue discussed in the next section.  
B.  The Issue of Choice.
   The human capital theory explains a portion of the wage gap,
which means that women still trail men to some degree in their
investments in education, work experience, and training.  We also saw
that women tend to work fewer hours and miss more work than men,
though neither factor appears to substantially explain the issue of gender
wage inequality.104 In addition, the most marked characteristic of the labor
market is the extreme sex segregation across occupations and jobs, a fact
that likewise appears to explain a significant portion of the pay gap,
although how much, and how the data ought to be interpreted, remain
hotly contested issues.105  Based on a common index of segregation, as of
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gap). 
106  SPAIN & BIANCHI, supra note 22, at 94; Blau, supra note 40, at 132 (placing
the index at 53 in 1990); David A. Cotter et al.,supra note 22, at 445  (“over half of
women would have to change their jobs before their occupational distribution would match
men’s”). 
107  See Erica L. Groshen, The Structure of the Female/Male Wage Differential:
Is it Who You Are, What You Do, or Where You Work?, 26 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES
457, 462 (1991) (noting that working in an integrated jobs is “fare more unusual” than
working in an integrated occupation); Paul L. Schumann, Dennis A. Ahlburg & Christine
Brown Mahoney, The Effects of Human Capital and Job Characteristics on Pay, 29 J. OF
HUMAN RESOURCES. 481, 498 (1994) (finding that women were assigned to lower graded
jobs than men and that gender played a significant role in assignments); Donald
Tomaksovic-Devey, Sex Composition and Gendered Earnings Inequality, at 38, in
GENDER INEQUALITY AT WORK (Jerry A. Jacobs ed., 1995) (concluding that gender job
segregation explains twice as much of the wage gap than occupational segregation). 
Segregation at the job level can be seen on law faculties where there exists a high degree of
sex segregation in teaching assignments.  See Deborah Merritt Jones & Barbara F. Reskin,
Sex, Race and Credentials: The Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 267 (1997) (noting that “men and women teach on the same law
faculties today, but they are often hired to teach different courses”).     
108  See SPAIN & BIANCHI, supra note 22, at 123 (noting that "[o]n average . . .
female-dominated occupations pay less well than male-dominated ones."); Blau, supra note
40, at 127 (“Considerable research suggests that predominantly female occupations pay
less, even controlling for measured personal characteristics of workers and a variety of
characteristics of occupations and industries.”); Paula England et al., The Effect of Sex
Composition of Jobs on Starting Wages In an Organization: Findings from the NLSY, 33
DEMOGRAPHY 511, 520 (1996) ("These findings add to the cumulating evidence that those
who work in female-dominated jobs pay a wage penalty -- that employers assign them
lower wages than if the job had a larger proportion of men working in it."); Fields &
Wolff, supra note 45, at 118 (finding women's concentration in lower paying industries
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1990, about half of the women in the labor force would have to switch
occupations to achieve equal representation among occupations.106
Focusing on occupations likely understates the prevailing level of
segregation as there is strong evidence that segregation is even more
extreme at the job, rather than occupation, level, and it is still rare that
men and women work in gender integrated jobs.107  It has also been
widely documented that female-dominated jobs pay substantially less than
those occupied principally by men,108 and we know that women tend to
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explains about one-third of wage gap).  A recent study seeking to determine whether there
were differences between black and white women in the structure of gender equality found
no clear pattern.  Black and white women both suffered similar sharp wage penalties when
the occupation was dominated by women, but black women received a small wage
premium for being married, while white women did not.  See Barbara Kilbourne, Paula
England, Kurt Beron, Effects of Individual, Occupational and Industrial Characteristics
on Earnings: Intersections of Race and Gender, 72 SOCIAL FORCES 1149 (1994).
109  The issue of leave taking is discussed infra section I.D.
110  See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women’s Choices, 24 GA. L. REV.
761 (1990) (critiquing what she defines as ideological determination arguments); Anne M.
Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1994); Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and
Women’s Liberation: Against Porn-Suppression, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (1994); Nadine
Strossen, The Tensions Between Regulating Workplace Harassment and the First
Amendment: No Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 701 (1995).. 
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be primarily responsible for child rearing, and as discussed in more detail
below, they also take greater leave at the birth of their children than do
men and suffer financially because of their leaves.109  As such, the data
indicate that men and women tend to perform different jobs both in and
out of the workplace.
   Given these facts, a question naturally arises as to how we should
evaluate this part of the story.  One version might view these facts as the
product of social forces, including discrimination, that limit the
opportunities of women in a number of complicated ways.  Contrarily, we
may also view these results as the product of choice emanating from
autonomous individuals choosing their life paths, a view that is common
within economic models and increasingly common among some female
legal scholars.110  Within this perspective, the fact that women occupy
different jobs may appear to be the result of personal preferences, and,
therefore, not a proper cause for societal concern.  In my judgment, this
view offers a highly problematic way of looking at the world, one that is
far too simplistic to capture the complexities and nuances of choice and
preference, complexities that confound easy attribution and that all too
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
111  In her important book on gender justice within the family, Susan Moller Okin
states that matter this way: “The basic problem with the human capital approach is that,
like much of neoclassical economic theory, it pays too little attention to the multiple
constraints placed on people’s choices.  It pays too little attention to differentials of power
between the sexes both in the workplace and in the family.  It thus ignores the fact that
women’s commitment and attachment to the workplace are strongly influenced by a
number of factors that are largely beyond their control.”  SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE,
GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 148 (1989). 
112  One commentator recently observed that among economists “the axiom of
exogenous preferences is as old as liberal political philosophy itself.”  Samuel Bowles,
Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic
Institutions, 36 J. OF ECON. LIT. 75, 75 (1998).
113 See Reuben Gronau, Sex-Related Wage Differentials and Women's Interrupted
Labor Careers -- the Chicken or the Egg, 6 J. LAB. ECON. 277, 285-86 (1988) (noting
that employer expectations may reduce opportunities for training and promotion).  For
additional discussions see CYNTHIA B. LLOYD & BETH T. NIEMI, THE ECONOMICS OF SEX
DIFFERENTIALS 313 (1979) (fewer opportunities may reduce incentives for investment);
Glenn C. Loury, Discrimination in the Post-Civil Rights Era: Beyond Market
Interactions, 12 J. of Econ. Perspectives 117, 123-24 (1998) (explaining how perceptions
can become self-fulfilling prophecies); Cass Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop
Discrimination, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POLICY 22, 29 (1991) (discussing dynamic effects labor
-41-
many economic models fail to acknowledge.111  I will thus argue that it is
highly naive to treat the labor market as an unadulterated product of
rational utility maximizing, at least in a manner that ought to be treated as
unproblematic.
    
   Economic models typically consider observed labor market
characteristics as resulting from individual preferences –  preferences that
are treated as exogenous and not worthy of governmental concern.112
While the data provide only weak support for the notion that the existing
conditions are the product of preferences at all, the economists'
assumption of autonomous preferences has been severely criticized from
many different perspectives.  One analytical  difficulty arises in
determining whether women's occupational choices, or their human capital
investments, are a product of actual preferences, or a response to labor
market opportunities, what has been aptly labeled the "chicken or the egg"
problem.113 After all, and keeping with the economic model, in many
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market can have on human capital investments).
114  Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack
of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1750,1815-16 (1990)..
115  See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 836
(1989) (challenging the choices that are currently available and arguing for restructuring
choices). 
116  For an excellent recent overview on the literature see VALIAN, supra note 5.  
For additional useful discussions on the theme of social conditioning see, e.g., SANDRA
LIPSITZ BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER 133-75 (1993); BARBARA BERGMAN, THE
ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 40-62 (1986); CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE
DISTINCTIONS: SEX, GENDER, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 80-126 (1988); JUDITH LORBER,
PARADOXES OF GENDER 144-93 (1994); ROBERTA S. SIGEL, AMBITION &
ACCOMMODATION 9-23 (1996). 
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instances it would seemingly be rational for women to reduce their
investments to the extent those investments fail to return as much in the
labor market compared to similar investments committed by men.  Facing
reduced opportunities for promotion as well as lower wages, and likely
having to confront at some point in one's career a decision regarding how
best to balance work and family, women may decide it is not worth
pursuing extra degrees, experience or training when the investment offers
a discriminatory rate of return –  keeping in mind, however, that the
observed disparities in these factors do not fully explain the disadvantages
faced by women.  As Professor Vicki Schultz explains, "Like all workers,
women adapt their work aspirations and orientations rationally and
purposefully, but always within and in response to the constraints of
organizational arrangements not of their own making."114
   This is one way the "choices" women  make can be dramatically
influenced by the labor market.  Another and perhaps more significant
way in which women's choices may be shaped, or constrained, is through
social conditioning that affects all of us, male and female alike.115  There
is a great volume of literature on the role social conditioning plays in
creating our gendered world, and in particular in producing our segregated
labor market, which I will only touch upon here.116 Just as it is difficult to
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117  This socialization, what is also sometimes called social control theory,
continues throughout our lives.  See Jerry A. Jacobs, Gender and Academic Specialties:
Trends Among Recipients of College Degrees in the 1980s, 68 SOCIOLOGY OF
EDUCATION 81,96 (1995) (“Social control is not simply a matter of early life socialization
that determines all adult behavior; rather, continuing social constraints are required to keep
women and men in their sex-appropriate domains.”).
118  See BERGMAN, supra note 116, at 87-114 (discussing ways in which jobs
become gendered); BARBARA F. RESKIN & PATRICIA A. ROOS, JOB QUEUES, GENDER
QUEUES 10-64 (1990) (discussing how jobs can be transformed from female to male jobs). 
In her very interesting study of female marines and male nurses, Christine Williams
demonstrates how gender roles persist even for those who choose nontraditional
occupations.  See CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS, GENDER DIFFERENCES AT WORK: WOMEN &
MEN IN NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS (1989).  
119   JACOBS, supra note 64, at 75.  Jacobs notes that approximately 50% of
women aspire to a male-dominated occupation at some point in their career.  Id. at 103. 
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contest the importance of education and training for obtaining a desirable
job, it is equally difficult to dispute that many of our life decisions are
significantly influenced by social forces or that those forces tend to
operate on a distinctly gendered basis.  These forces range from the way
boys and girls are treated during infancy, to differential treatment in
schools regarding subjects, sports and other elements of school life, to the
images we see in the media and all around us.117  As noted earlier, the
empirical data suggest that women are not choosing jobs that make it
easier for them to accommodate their nonmarket activities, and a more
convincing explanation appears to be that women are channeled, or
crowded, into certain professions and jobs, even though it may appear that
these jobs are the product of individual choice.118  Consistent with this
view, survey data indicate that “[w]omen consistently aspire to more male
dominated pursuits than those in which they are employed,”119 suggesting
that many women would prefer to be in occupations different from the
ones they currently hold.        
   This is the very point at which the issue becomes complicated for
purposes of interpretation, and by using the term “channeling”, I am
revealing my own biases — biases that admittedly cannot be fully
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120  There are also those who believe that our gendered choices are the product of
biology, a movement that seems to be gaining some steam in the form of sociobiology.  For
a popular account see ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL (1995).  For a contrary
view, namely that biology determines virtually none of our behaviors, see JOHN DUPRE,
THE DISORDER OF THINGS: METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DISUNITY OF SCIENCE
(1993).  This is an issue on which there is strong disagreement and what seems to me
profound ideological interests tied to the various interpretations.  As one commentator has
aptly noted, “The debate over nature looks depressingly insoluble.  Both sides can
recognize the biological evidence, for what it is worth; but they give it different
significance.”  Julia Annas, Women and the Quality of Life: Two Norms or One? at 293,
in THE QUALITY OF LIFE (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen, eds. 1993).  For a recent
attempt to find some middle position see Melvin Konner, Darwin’s Truth, Jefferson’s
Vision, AMERICAN PROSPECT 30 (July-Aug. 1999).    
121  Elizabeth Anderson makes the interesting suggestion that we should look at
people's attitudes about their choices rather than their revealed preferences.  "Individuals
have positive or negative attitudes toward their choices," she argues, "which reveal how
well their choices reflect the valuations they have of themselves and others."  ELIZABETH
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 202 (1993).  Although people's attitudes
may provide more reliable information then their actual choices, attitudes are also strongly
shaped by choices, as people seek to adapt to what is available to them.  This insight is
animating much of what is now becoming known as Behavioral Law and Economics,
though to my mind the best (and most entertaining) discussion of the issue remains JON
ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983).     
122  For a recent discussion involving the difficult issue of determining “when can
we say that our choices are truly our own,” see LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, STACKED DECK
101-32 (1998).             
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supported by the data.120  Indeed, in deciding between choice or social
construction, no data can provide a conclusive explanation, as even the
best data would likely be tainted by structural issues affected by
discrimination.  This is certainly true of the question posed earlier whether
women are expressing preferences or responding to opportunities,  and
even during interviews, we would not necessarily expect women to state
that they chose their job because social forces had limited their
opportunities or structured their decisions.121 Rather, any explanation
would likely involve numerous reasons and motivations, all of which were
influenced by a complex array of forces, some known and some
unknown.122 
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123  See LOUIS ALTHUSSER, FOR MARX 138 (B. Brewster trans. 1977).
124   Deborah L. Rhode, Changing Images of the State: Feminism and the State,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1189 (1994).
125  This is obviously a controversial statement on which countless books and
articles have been written, and there are certainly many variants on the theme of equality. 
In his compelling account of equality, Amartya Sen, for example, argues that the
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   This is what is important to keep in mind, the sheer multitude of
forces that play a role in our decisionmaking, leading to what Louis
Althusser defined, in a different context, as a state of  semi-autonomy.123
To be sure, many individual women choose non-traditional jobs, and just
as many women undoubtedly happily choose traditional female roles
relatively free of social constraints, and it is also important to recognize
that many people are able to exercise more choice in their lives than
others.  At the same time, it is surely impossible to deny the substantial
sex segregation that continues to define the labor market, and that the
segregation cannot be fully accepted as the product of unconstrained
choice. As Deborah Rhode argues, "[T]o an important extent, women's
preferences are socially constructed and constrained.  The state does not
simply respond to expressed desires; it plays an active role in legitimating,
suppressing, or redirecting them."124
  It is, thus, necessary to craft a theory that best explains what we
do know regarding the role of preferences and choice in determining labor
market inequality.  And what we do know is that women continue to be
paid less, receive less responsibility, and fewer opportunities for
promotions than their male counterparts –  and that a large number of
women, perhaps all in some way, are penalized by the decision of some
women to leave the workforce to care for their children.  We also know
that the explanations proffered by neoclassical economic models have not
been sufficiently supported by empirical studies; based on those studies
it would be difficult to suggest that women’s choices, even if freely
derived, explained the persistent inequalities.  Additionally, we know that
the definition of equality that gains the widest acceptance is that of
equality of opportunity,125 and we also know that currently women and
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“[e]quality of freedom to pursue our ends cannot be generated by equality in the
distribution of goods” but must instead be concerned with creating the conditions that
provide individuals with the capability to achieve their chosen ends.  See AMARTYA SEN,
INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 39-55 (1992).  That said, I feel comfortable in asserting that
equality of opportunity is the most widely shared conception of equality since the concept
of equality of opportunity is important to all theories of equality, with the dispute largely
over whether it is a sufficient condition as well as the necessary conditions for achieving a
state where equality of opportunity can be a reality.       
126  At this point, it may be helpful to make clear that  I am not advocating that
women be permitted to work part-time while maintaining full-time pay, benefits and
promotional opportunities, or that there be no penalty for lengthy absences from the labor
market.  Although it is difficult to dispute the attraction of part-time work at full-time pay,
requiring employers to ignore hours and substantial labor market absences may impose too
onerous a burden that would require overlooking real evidence regarding productivity. 
Increasing part-time work for women, with benefits, is the strategy present in many
European countries, particularly the Netherlands where a very low percentage of women
with children work full-time.  See Cristina Duarte, The Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993: Paying the Price for an Imperfect Solution, 32 U. OF LOUISVILLE J. OF FAMILY
LAW 833, 847 (1994).  In the United States, it seems highly unlikely that we will move
towards non-marginalized part-time work –  work that offers good wages and benefits, as
well as opportunities for advancement – so that moving toward creating more part-time
work does not appear to be a viable means toward reducing existing labor market
inequality.  
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men do not face the same opportunities, and that if we are to move to a
greater level of equality, at a minimum women must be afforded the
choices and opportunities provided to men.  Only then, if women continue
to make different choices, could we properly assert that the choices are a
matter of preferences. 
   This is not to suggest that we take the male role in the labor
market as the norm.  On the contrary, as developed more fully in section
III.B., I will argue that legislative solutions should effectively treat women
as the norm in the workplace.  What I mean to suggest here is that women
should not be penalized for their perceived or expected behavior, and that
equalizing choices between men and women may entail changing the
choices currently available to both men and women.126 But before
discussing various strategies that may enable us to break up the prevailing
patterns, it will be useful to first discuss another theory— that of statistical
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127  The earliest articulation of the concept within economics is Edmund S. Phelps,
The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AMER. ECON. REV. 659 (1972).  For
additional discussions see Dennis J. Aigner and Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of
Discrimination in Labor Markets, 30 INDUS. & LABOR REL. REV. 175 (1977); Kenneth J.
Arrow, Models of Job Discrimination, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 83
(Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972); Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?
76 AMER. ECON. REV. 228 (1996).  For helpful discussions within law, most of which are
critical of the concept see Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in
Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 850-52 (1991); David Charny & G.
Mitu Gulati, Efficiency Wages, Tournaments, and Discrimination: A Theory of
Employment Discrimination for “High Level” Jobs, 33 HARV. C. R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 63-
85 (1998); Drucilla Cornell & William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic
Wrongs of Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 595 (1999); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial
Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619
(1991).
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discrimination —  that is often used to explain women's continued labor
market status.
     
C.  THE ROLE OF STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION.
   I have so far reviewed two important explanations for the
continued and persistent gender inequality that continues to plague the
workplace, namely differences in human capital investments and the role
"choice" plays in perpetuating gender patterns.  If neither of these theories
explains the observed gender inequalities, then what does?  A theory that
is becoming increasingly important is known as statistical discrimination,
a concept that has had its strongest influence within economics although
it is playing a growing role within law as well.127 The theory of statistical
discrimination, discussed in detail below, is generally treated as separate
from the human capital explanation, but the ideas are closely related, and
the perceived differences in human capital investments fully animate the
concept of statistical discrimination, which often serves as a catch-all
theory to explain what is otherwise left unexplained by the data.  In other
words, the notion of statistical discrimination is used primarily to fill in the
gaps left by other economic explanations; for example, to the extent
human capital investments do not fully explain wage disparities the
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128  Indeed, the more the facts deviate from the theory, statistical discrimination
begins to resemble animus-based discrimination. See CYNTHIA B. LLOYD & BETH T.
NIEMI, THE ECONOMICS OF SEX DIFFERENTIALS 201 (1979) ("[A] theory of statistical
discrimination based on erroneous estimates of female productivity comes very close to the
theory of discrimination based on prejudice."); Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit,
Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1294 (1995)
(arguing that "statistical race discrimination starts to appear analytically indistinguishable
from taste discrimination").
129  See EHRENBERG &  SMITH, supra note 44, at 440-43.
130  For a discussions along these lines see Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse
Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating The Demands of Pregnancy, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2168-69; Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality:
Gender Discrimination, Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595
(1993).    
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remaining unexplained portions are often attributed to statistical
discrimination.  But, as I will argue below, there is very little reason to
believe that employers’ policies, with respect to compensation and hiring
practices, are adequately explained by the idea of statistical
discrimination, or at least statistical discrimination that ought to be treated
as a rational employer policy.128
  
1.  The Theory of Statistical Discrimination.
The general concept of statistical discrimination is relatively
straightforward:  when employers lack perfect information, and where it
would be too costly to collect such information, they will resort to group
averages to determine the potential productivity of individuals.129  In the
context of this article, this means that employers will often treat women
differently from men because, on average, women are more likely to leave
the workforce to have and to raise children, and these potential exits can
be costly for employers.130 With respect to prospective employees, relying
on group averages can be particularly important because it is often
difficult for an employer to obtain reliable information in advance as to the
likelihood that any particular individual will later leave the workforce.
One reason for this is that it is potentially unlawful for employers to ask
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131  See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 130, at 620.
132  Law schools typically place substantial weight on LSAT scores, which offer
group prediction about the likelihood of success during the first year.  See Michael A.
Olivas, Constitutional Criteria: The Social Science and Common Law of Admissions in
Higher Education, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065 (1997) (discussing role of LSAT in
admissions decisions).  As is well known, these scores are quite inaccurate as to particular
individuals but offer some prediction for the group as a whole, which captures the essence
of statistical discrimination.  
133  See Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
In Manhart, the Supreme Court invalidated a state policy that required female employees
to make higher pension contributions than men because women tend to live longer and
thus, as a class, would likely receive greater pension benefits than men.  Although the
parties, and the Court, accepted as true the factual basis for the policy, the Court held that
the practice was “in direct conflict with both the language and the policy of the Act.”  Id.
at 712.  See also Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983)
(invalidating sex-based practice of paying out less to women).    
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applicants, especially if they only ask their female applicants, but more
significantly, the question will rarely yield accurate information as
employees know, or can reasonably predict, the desired answer. To the
extent employers believe this information is important, it is often
contended that they are left to rely on their group observations as the best
available information.131
   As a concept, there is nothing particularly insidious about relying
on statistical information to make judgments about individuals.  After all,
that is how law schools make most of their admission decisions,132 and
hardly a day goes by when we don't resort to group averages as the basis
for some sort of prediction or determination.  Yet, relying on group
observations can also lead to unfair treatment, and in the workplace,
statistical discrimination based on gender is generally unlawful -- even
where it might be efficient.133  With this in mind, it is important to see just
how inaccurate the use of statistical information can be and how it affects
all women, even those who display persistent workforce attachment
throughout their careers.
2.  Is Statistical Discrimination Justified?
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134  See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
135  See Light & Ureta, supra note 98, at 179-80 (finding no evidence that it is
more difficult to identify female nonquitters than male).
136  VALIAN, supra note 5, at 210-26 (discussing ways discrimination can
adversely affect women’s careers in academia); Deborah L. Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 585, 587 (1996) (“female lawyers consistely report receiving fewer
opportunities for mentoring, business development, and desirable assignments than their
male colleagues.”).  For an excellent discussion for how these issues arise in law firms
with respect to racial stereotypes see David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There
So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms?  An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L.
REV. 493 (1996).  
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   Earlier we saw just how inaccurate the theory of statistical
discrimination is when applied to women's likely workforce behavior.
After having children, most women return to their prior working condition
within four to six months, with most women returning to the kind of work
and hours they had before giving birth.134  What this means is that on
average, the women who had a weak labor force commitment prior to
having children will be the ones most likely not to return to work, or to
quit their position after having returned for some period of time and
finding the demands of work and family too taxing.135  Yet, as previously
noted, employers contend that because it is difficult to know who those
employees will be –  just as it is difficult to know in advance who the
committed or superior employees will ever be –  it is efficient for them to
resort to their gender barometer knowing that it remains more likely that
women will leave the workforce than men.  This reliance on gender data
can play itself out in subtle ways, such as not granting women long-term
assignments, not reaching out to mentor the young employee, or
evaluating their work product differently because the evaluation is tinged
with a different view of women's commitment to the workforce.136
   The use of statistical information in this fashion is routinely
treated as an efficient employment practice, and is often referred to as
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137  See EDWARD MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 243 (1997) ("From the
employer's point of view, statistical discrimination is 'rational' or efficient and profit-
maximizing."); EDMUND S. PHELPS, REWARDING WORK 114 (1997) (discussing rational
discrimination); James Albrecht & Susan Vroman, The Gender Gap in Compensation:
Evaluating Policies to Reduce the Gender Gap, An Economic Approach, 82 GEO. L.J.
69, 72 (1993) ("It is rational for an employer with such beliefs to engage in statistical
discrimination in the sense of requiring that female applicants for good jobs show more
objective evidence of a long-term commitment to the workforce than must their male
counterparts."); Susan Bisom Rapp, Of Motives and Maleness: A Critical View of Mixed
Motive Doctrine in Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1029, 1089
(equating statistical discrimination with rational discrimination); Keith N. Hylton &
Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence,
and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237, 247 (1996) (“the theory of
statistical discrimination . . . posits that racial discrimination reflects rational predictions
of the behavior of the group subject to discrimination.”); Cass Sunstein, The Anticaste
Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2452 (1994) (“Insofar as statistical discrimination is
outlawed, the government has singled out one form of rational categorization.”); Amy L.
Wax, Discrimination As Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 878, 922 (1999) (identifying statistical
discrimination as rational discrimination).  
138  Robert Kuttner explains: “Economists enamored of pure markets begin with
the theory, and hang models on assumptions that cannot themselves be challenged . . . . [I]f
wages for manual workers are declining, it must be that their economic value is declining .
. . If commercial advertising leads consumers to buy shoddy or harmful products, they
must be ‘maximizing their utility’ . . .  How do we know that?  Because to do anything else
would be irrational.  And how do we know that individuals always behave rationally? 
Because that is the premise from which we begin.”  ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR
SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS 9 (1998). 
139  See text accompanying notes 156-67, infra.
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rational discrimination.137 This argument, however, embodies some of the
sophistry that defines much of traditional law and economics: namely the
notion that if it were not efficient, employers would not do it.138  There are
by now well-developed explanations for why employers may engage in
practices that cannot be properly described as rational, which will be
discussed in more detail below,139 but I here want to explain as a
theoretical matter why the assumption of rationality that underlies
statistical discrimination is plainly overbroad.  Whether the practice of
treating women differently because of their greater propensity to leave the
workforce to care for children is truly efficient involves an empirical
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140  See Light & Ureta, supra note 98, at 158 (noting that “any conclusion about
whether statistical discrimination is ‘justified” depends entirely on which birth cohorts are
being examined.”). 
141  See VALIAN, supra note 5, at 174-86 (discussing the effects of discrimination
on women’s careers).
142  See infra text accompanying notes 209-10.
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question that is very rarely tested and is generally context dependent.140
At a minimum, determining the efficiency of relying on group averages
would require knowing what the costs of the labor market disruptions
actually are, as well as their expected probability, and those costs would
then have to be compared to the lost productivity that occurs through the
differential treatment women receive –  the costs of the lack of mentoring,
or the devaluation of women's work product, and the higher turnover that
might resort from this treatment.141  It would also be important to know
the cost of obtaining more individualized information, which in any
calculus should be weighed against the costs of engaging in statistical
discrimination.
  
   Let me sketch an example.  Suppose an employer believes there
is a thirty percent chance a female employee will not return from work
after having a child.  In determining the cost of that disruption, an
employer would want to first assess the cost of the potential turnover,
which would take into account its normal turnover rate as it would be
highly unusual for an employer to have no turnover at all.  Assuming a
firm has some turnover, one would then want to determine the marginal
cost of the turnover associated with the potential that an employee will not
return to work to care for a child.  As discussed in the next section,
employers have had little trouble covering employees on temporary
maternity leave, and in many jobs, replacement costs associated with
additional individuals are not particularly high because they are so
routine.142  In this respect, it is not the absolute cost of a replacement that
matters but the marginal or relative cost that should concern an employer.
   Balanced against those costs, would be the costs of relying on
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143  See Andrew Schotter & Keith Weiglet, Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal
Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results, 107 Q. J. OF
ECON. 511 (1992) (applying tournament theory to the workplace); Selmi, supra note 128
at 1304-05 (discussing ways in which employers create workplace competition to spurn
productivity). 
144  This is also true with respect to turnover that occurs early in a career since
such turnovers are frequent among both men and women.  See Light & Ureta, supra note
98, at 157 (noting the high propensity of “young workers . . . to quit their jobs regardless
of gender.”).
-53-
group averages.  Assuming an employer is considering not hiring or
promoting women, or reducing its hiring or promotions of women,  that
employer would want to know the costs that might arise from foreclosing
an entire group of qualified applicants, particularly when the firm’s
competitors may reap the benefits of that policy.  A firm with a poor
reputation for hiring or retaining women will suffer some market
disadvantage in hiring women, leaving them potentially with a lower
quality applicant pool.  Similarly, if a firm chooses to pay women less, or
to invest in them less, there might also be a corresponding loss in
productivity while the employee is on the job, and that loss may spillover
to other employees.  Male employees who know that their female
counterparts are at a competitive disadvantage  may reduce their own
work effort in response to their competitive edge.143 
             
   An important additional factor that needs to be weighed in the
efficiency calculus is the length of the expected labor force disruptions,
as it would certainly be unjustified for an employer to treat any leave as
unduly costly, or all leaves as equally costly.  While permanent exits may
be costly (depending on the job and its natural turnover rate), the short
labor force disruptions of most women should not create equivalent
costs.144  An employee's skills are unlikely to recede with any time off
from the labor market, though at a certain point, depending on the nature
of the job, there is likely to be some significant loss of skill.  For example,
a lawyer taking six months off is likely to miss little that cannot be
regained quickly, while taking two or three years off may lead to a
significant depreciation, as new cases are decided, and skills honed in the
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145  Again, this will depend on the particular job -- some tasks, estate planning
comes to mind, may not experience an erosion of skills at all.
146  As noted earlier, this is the average length of  leave for childbearing.  See
supra text accompanying notes 83-85.  Within the statistical discrimination model, the
average is the appropriate figure to use.   See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 44, at 41. 
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courtroom or elsewhere, recede.145
   As a result, from the statistical discrimination prism, the question
of interest for an employer ought to be determining the cost from a four-
month leave that may occur once or twice in the course of a career, rather
than assuming that women are likely to exit the labor market
permanently.146  Although productivity is notoriously difficult to measure,
when the issue is placed in this stark framework, the cost of the
workforce disruption to employers does not appear so daunting,
especially when measured against other anticipated work disruptions,
such as sickness, vacation, illness, injury, or jury service.  Indeed, to
know whether employers are engaging in a form of statistical
discrimination that ought to be defined as rational, as opposed to
stereotypical or animus-based decisionmaking, it is important to know
how employers weigh these other potential labor market disruptions for
which individualized predictive information is difficult to obtain.  Given
that most leaves for childbirth are of short duration, predictable and
infrequent, it seems irrational for an employer to single out pregnancy-
related leave for particular treatment among all the potential labor force
disruptions.
Yet, discussions concerning statistical discrimination and the
gender gap often treat childbearing as if it were the only condition that
employees bring to the labor market that may impose costs on employers.
There are, however, an abundance of other conditions that may impose
equal or higher costs that rarely seem to be taken into account.  An
employer concerned with potential lost productivity due to workplace
disruptions might want to screen out those employees who are prone to
alcoholism, illnesses or injuries, all of which are more prominent among
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147  See NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE, PRELIMINARY
RESULTS FROM THE 1997 HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE at Tables 15 & 16
(1998).
148  GARY A. TOSCANO ET AL., Work Injuries and Illnesses Occurring to Women,
3 COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS 16 (1998) (footnote omitted).  As a way of
reducing costs further, employers may also wish to screen out those most likely to engage
in sexual harassment, which costs the employer both in legal judgments and also in the
reduced productivity of both the harasser and the victim of the harassment
149  See  text accompanying notes 93-95 supra.
150  See VALIAN, supra note 5, at 225 (observing that in academia “recent female
graduates start out on an equal salary footing . . . but lose that equality as early as three to
eight years post-PhD.”); William T. Bielby & Denise T. Bielby, supra note 36, at 223-25
(finding continuous disadvantage faced by female television writers throughout their
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men.  Recent statistics indicate that men are three times as likely as
women to be binge drinkers and four times as likely to be heavy drinkers,
with twenty-three percent of men defined as binge drinkers.147  Similarly,
“women incurred less than one-tenth of job-related fatal injuries and one-
third of the non-fatal injuries and illnesses that required time off to
recuperate.”148  In other words, there are lots of adverse behaviors
employees bring to the workplace that correlate with gender, and it is
difficult to imagine, and certainly wrong to assume, that the only
differences that matter are the potential short-term exits of women to have
children.
       
   Finally, another factor that may cast doubt on whether rational
statistical discrimination truly explains an employer’s behavior is that it
would be most efficient for employers to use such knowledge or
information in the hiring process, where it is often difficult to assess an
employee's likely future labor force behavior.  Once an employee is on the
job, the employer is in a position to collect reliable information
unavailable at the time of hire, especially given that past employment
behavior remains the best predictor of future workforce attachment.149
Yet, there is substantial evidence that women are disadvantaged
throughout their careers, and considerable evidence to suggest that more
discrimination occurs after rather than before hiring.150 
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career); Jerry A. Jacobs, Women's Entry Into Management: Trends in Earnings,
Authority, and Values Among Salaried Managers, 37 ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE Q. 282,
290 (1992) (documenting discriminatory pay patterns among female managers); Janet
Rosenberg, et al., Now That We Are Here: Discrimination, Disparagement, and
Harassment at Work and the Experience of Women Lawyers, 7 GENDER & SOCIETY 415,
422 (1993) (found more perceived discrimination on the job than in hiring among female
lawyers). 
151  See VALIAN, supra note 5, at 257 (discussing how statistical discrimination
makes life difficult for all women).
152  See Shelly J. Lundberg & Richard Startz, Private Discrimination and Social
Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets, 73 AMER. ECON. REV. 340 (1983) (arguing
that statistical discrimination can lead to “suboptimal levels of human capital”).  The
question whether women have a higher turnover rate than men has generated considerable
controversy.  Both men and women tend to have unstable early careers as they search for
better experience and job matches, and those experiences do not seem to negatively affect
labor job patterns.  See Gardecki & Neumark, supra note 40, at 18-19 (“We find that
adult labor outcomes (defined as of the late 20s or early to mid-30s) are for the most part
unrelated to the stability of early labor market experiences . . .); Light & Ureta, supra note
83, at 157 (“While women are more prone than men to leave the labor force, the fact is
that young workers are likely to quit their jobs regardless of gender.”).  A recent study of a
large insurance company found that while women had a higher quit rate early in their
career, after five years with the firm women were thereafter less likely than men to leave
-56-
  
   The above discussion suggests that the assumption that statistical
discrimination is rational and efficient is not well grounded, and at a
minimum involves a far more complicated analysis than is generally
assumed.  However, even if we treat the use of statistical information to
disadvantage women as an efficient practice, there are social costs that
need to be considered in evaluating the desirability of the practice.  By its
very nature, statistical discrimination is overbroad in its reach, which
means that relying on group averages has its greatest adverse effect on
those individuals who do not fit the average, or the assumed average, in
this case, those women who do not leave, and do not intend to leave, the
workforce for family commitments.151 The result of this overbroad
judgment is that the employer will waste, or underutilize, talent, and may
find higher turnover among its female employees, all of which negatively
affects our social welfare.152 
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their employment.  See Nachum Sicherman, Gender Differences in Departures From A
Large Firm, 49 INDUS. & LABOR REL. L. REV. 484 (1996).  Women do seem to suffer a
greater penalty for early turnover, likely because of their stronger need to signal workplace
commitment to employers.  Gardecki & Neumark, supra at 319.  Women also tend to
work in industries with higher turnover rates.  See W. Kip Viscusi, Sex Differences in
Worker Quitting, 62 REV. ECON. & STAT. 388, 397 (1980) (“Almost the entire predicted
male-female quit difference and half of the actual difference can be explained by
differences in their jobs and regional economic conditions.”).     
153  The classic elaboration of the theory, although developed in the context of
animus rather than statistical discrimination, is GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).  Although it has largely gone unnoticed, Becker has since
claimed that his theory has been misunderstood, as he originally argued that firm
production functions, as well as discrimination by employers and customers could sustain
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   This does not mean that the theory of statistical discrimination
fails to offer some explanatory power as to why women are paid less, and
offered fewer promotional opportunities than men.  On the contrary, I
believe the theory provides important insights into employer's practices,
as employers do seem to take into account women’s greater likelihood of
leaving the workforce to have children in their  employment decisions.
But they do so in an exaggerated way, and such  practices are at best
crude and likely inefficient, or at least as likely to be inefficient as
efficient, and certainly should not be tolerated to the extent they are based
on inaccurate perceptions of women's labor market attachment,
perceptions that, as discussed earlier, might become self-fulfilling
prophecies as women adapt to the lesser opportunities available to them.
3.  The Need for Government Intervention.    
      At this juncture, the traditional neoclassical economic model
would still likely resist the heed for governmental intervention.  To the
extent employers continue to rely on inaccurate group averages, according
to the neoclassical model, the practice is unlikely to persist since
competitive market pressures would eventually eliminate the use of these
averages.  Firms that relied on better information would ultimately obtain
a more efficient workforce and thus drive out the less efficient
competitors.153  This is a familiar but rather tired argument that has lost
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discriminatory practices.  See GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 142 (1996).    
154  For recent legal discussions see Wayne R. Cohen, An Economic Analysis of
the Issues Surrounding AIDS in the Workplace: In the Long Run, the Path of Truth and
Reason Cannot be Diverted, 41 AMER. U. L. REV. 1199 (1992) (noting that firms are
unlikely to maintain discriminatory workplace); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Sex, Law &
Equality: You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the Transformation of
Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1588, 1622 (1997) (arguing
that employers will likely forego discrimination in competitive markets); Hylton &
Rogeua, supra note --, at 250-51 (suggesting lending discrimination should not persist in a
competitive market); Peter Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A
Law and Economics Analysis, TEXAS L. REV. 787, 840 (1995) (same).
155  For an excellent discussion of the various economic theories of discrimination
and their inability to explain the persistence of labor market discrimination see Jeremiah
Cotton, Labor Markets and Racial Inequality, in LABOR ECONOMICS: PROBLEMS IN
ANALYZING LABOR MARKETS 183-208 (William Darity, Jr. ed., 1993); see also Kenneth
J. Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination, 12 J. OF ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 91 (1998) (discussing ways in which race discrimination can survive even
in competitive markets); William A. Darity & Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on
Discrimination in Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 12 J. OF ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 63, 82-87 (1998).  For discussions relating to gender see Mary E. Becker,
Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural Remedies for Racial and
Sexual Disadvantages, 79 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1673 (1991) (arguing that unrealistic to expect
the market to eliminate sex discrimination because women are undervalued and segregation
creates employment taboos); Paula England, Wage Appreciation and Depreciation: A
Test of Neoclassical Economic Explanations of Occupational Sex Segregation, 62 SOC.
FORCES 726, 741-42 (1984) (suggesting theory fails to explain sex segregation); Paul
Milgrom & Sharon Oster, Job Discrimination, Market Forces and the Invisibility
Hypothesis, 102 Q. J. OF ECON. 453 (1987) (arguing that because skills and abilities of
women and minorities are undervalued they remain invisible in the marketplace).
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most of its appeal outside of law.154 Within the economics and
sociological literature, it is now widely acknowledged that competitive
market pressures have not, and will not, eliminate broadscale
discrimination in labor markets.155
  One reason why discrimination persists in labor markets is that so
many employees are ready substitutes for each other, accordingly, an
employer may not lose much by choosing a male over a female candidate
for a particular position, even though there is no productivity-based
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156  See Charny & Gulati, supra note 127, at 76-77 (discussing low costs of
discrimination when employees are alike).
157  See John J. Donohue, III, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective:
Three Concepts of Equality, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2583, 2596-97 (1994). 
158 BERGMANN, supra note 116, at 139.  
159  Arrow, supra note 155, at 98.  In the same article, Arrow acknowledges that
there is evidence of racial discrimination in the economy today.  Id. at 99. 
160  Id. at 98 (noting that “[t]he network model seems most appropriate for the
labor market . . .”); see also Bratton & Cornell, supra note 127, at 624-30 (explaining how
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reason to do so.156  Additionally, discrimination may persist in labor
markets, as John Donohue has argued, because employees in the labor
market often have restricted mobility and therefore are unable to gravitate
to nondiscriminating employers, distinguishing the labor market from the
stock market and creating another barrier to market clearing.157  Whether
or not these facts make an employer’s practices efficient, as noted earlier
is ultimately a difficult empirical question, but we certainly know that
discrimination has persisted to a far greater extent than neoclassical
economic theory predicted. As economist Barbara Bergmann commented
some time ago: “We see thousands of business failures every year in the
United States, so firms do make fatal mistakes; but no one has ever
reported seeing a firm that discriminated reduced to ruin by a less bigoted
competitor,”158 a statement that still holds true today. 
   Another reason for the stubborn pace of change is that old habits
die hard.  The practices that may be inefficient in some sense and yet
have become an accepted part of a business practice may also become
part of that business culture and thus difficult to uproot.  As Kenneth
Arrow has recently noted, the network of personal interactions that form
a business culture can “leave plenty of room for discriminatory beliefs and
preferences to play a role which would be much less likely in a market
subject to competitive pressures.”159 These interactions include word of
mouth hiring, biases that factor into selection processes that render those
selecting individuals prone to choosing someone most like themselves.160
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English-only rules are often motivated by in-group bias); Bradford Cornell & Ivo Welch,
Culture, Information and Screening Discrimination, 104 J. POL. ECON. 542, 561 (1996)
(arguing that individuals favor associating with people of their own type because they
believe it is easier to judge their abilities).
161   See John M. Darley & Russell H. Fazio, Expectancy Confirmation Processes
Arising in the Social Interaction Sequence, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 867,876 (1986) (noting that
“[a] great deal of research suggests that ambiguous behaviors tend to be perceived in a
biased manner.”); Charles Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The
Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. OF PERSONALITY &
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2098, 2099 (1979) (contending that in the face of ambiguous
evidence people emphasize confirmatory evidence while discounting nonconfirmatory
information); Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. OF ECON. LIT. 11, 26
(1998) (“A range of research suggests that once forming strong hypotheses, people are
often too inattentive to new information contradicting their hypotheses.”); David M.
Sanbomatsu et al., Overestimating Causality: Attribution Effects of Confirmatory
Processing, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 892, 899 (1993) (concluding that
people use biased strategies so that causal hypotheses are confirmed). 
162  Rabin, supra note 161, at 30 (“A pervasive fact about human judgment is that
people disproportionately weight salient, memorable, or vivid evidence . . .”); Rhode,
supra note 136, at 587 (noting that the confirmatory bias means that mothers who leave
early will be remembered though not the times when they stay late).
163  VALIAN, supra note 5, at 168.  For an extended treatment of cognitive
psychology and how it might inform our analysis of discrimination issues see Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).  
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   There is also considerable evidence that individuals tend to resist
information that contradicts their existing stereotypes, providing yet
another reason why statistical discrimination may outlast its empirical
foundation.  It is now well-documented that individuals seek out
information that will confirm their stereotypes, while ignoring or
downplaying contrary information.161  Consistent information typically
remains more salient so that a woman who leaves the workforce after
having a child is likely to be remembered whereas the women who return
after a month or two of leave are not.162 As Virginia Valian explains, “We
interpret the information we receive about women . . . in the light of our
beliefs.”163   
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164  See, FAYE J. CROSBY, JUGGLING: THE UNEXPECTED ADVANTAGES OF
BALANCING CAREER & HOME FOR WOMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES  158-77 (documenting
subtle patterns of male resistance); JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER 225-52
(1994) (describing ways in which men “guard the gates”).  
165  Susan Moller Okin argues that husbands often exert influence over their wive’s
decisions not out of a “concern for aggregate welfare of the household but . . . by their
desire to retain the authority and privilege that accrues to them by virtue of being the
family’s breadwinner.”  OKIN, supra note 111, at 147. Kathy Abrams has also recently
forcefully demonstrated how sexual harassment has been used as a means of establishing
male control and masculine norms in the workplace.  See Kathryn Abrams, The New
Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1205-1218 (1998). 
Even Judge Posner has recently argued that men may want to expel women from the
workplace as a way of preserving status.  See Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard A. Posner,
Status Signaling and The Law, With Particular Application to Sexual Harassment, 147
U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1084-85 (1999).  For an interesting discussion as to how this process
of gender definition and subordination occurs see Karen D. Pyke, Class-Based
Masculinities: The Interdependence of Gender, Class, and Interpersonal Power, 10
GENDER & SOCIETY 527 (1996). .
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   Finally, an important, and I believe a closely related reason, such
habits die hard is that those in power, in this instance men, are reluctant
to relinquish that power and thus seek in a variety of often subtle ways to
preserve their privileged positions.  They do this not necessarily out of
animus, but more out of a desire to vindicate, and preserve, their place in
society.164  People naturally want to believe their success is a  result of
just procedures and talent, even if we all know this is not always the case
given that so much of our society is rooted in illegitimate and
discriminatory processes that have long coattails, processes that were
often intended to subordinate women.165  While the means of that
subordination have surely lessened, they remain stubbornly in place and
help explain why change has not occurred more quickly.  It is also
important to note that men have a great deal invested in preserving gender
roles, both as a way of understanding their world and as a means  to
enhancing their individual economic well-being.  Reducing gender
inequality in the workplace may cause a reevaluation of “men’s” and
“women’s” work and may also decrease the income and prestige of men,
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166  Christine Williams has argued that men benefit by preserving gender roles
“because our society has traditionally rewarded masculine qualities more highly than
feminine qualities.  It avails men to monopolize masculine qualities, emphasize them in
themselves, and enforce feminization on their female counterparts.”  WILLIAMS, supra note
117, at 8-9.  She concludes, “Men have historically used the occupational realm not only
to secure economic advantages over women, but also to establish and affirm their essential
difference from — and personal sense of superiority over — women.”  Id. at 133.  See
also Susan T. Fiske & Peter Glick, Ambivalence & Stereotypes Cause Sexual
Harassment: A Theory With Implications for Organizational Change, 51 J. OF SOCIAL
ISSUES 97, 105 (1995) (arguing that “[t]he introduction of women into male-dominated
jobs poses a threat to the gender-identity based self-esteem of men in these jobs.”).      
167  See text and citations at note 152.
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even though it is likely to increase family income overall.166  Changing the
given roles,  may also send a signal of condemnation to previous
generations, one that is sure to be resisted.  Suggesting that men need to
take time off to care for their children, for example, may imply that an
earlier generation were not as good fathers as they should have been, or
believed they were, or that the old model has outlasted its utility. 
   This focus on preserving privilege is somewhat difficult to square
with an economic focus, but it highlights why we must not make
efficiency the touchstone of our legal strictures, and why also we should
not assume that the market is a frictionless machine grinding its way
toward maximizing our social welfare.  On the contrary, the use of
statistical discrimination perpetuates gender stratification and inequality,
and therefore reduces our social welfare.  In this respect, the social cost
of statistical discrimination may be far greater than the private cost to
firms, given that individual firms are not likely forfeiting significant profits
through their policies while socially we pay the cumulative cost.167  A
society committed to gender equality, to providing equality of opportunity
to women, should likewise be committed to eradicating the structures that
perpetuate inequality.  As a result, we ought to find ways in which to
preclude employers from making statistical judgments that greatly
disadvantage women with at best minimal efficiency returns to employers.
 
D.  Men and Family Leave
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168  A study conducted by Families and Work Institute indicates that fathers were
just as likely as mothers to indicate a willingness to trade salary for dependent assistance
benefits.  See Ellen Galinsky et al., The Role of Employers in Addressing the Needs of
Employed Parents, 52 J. OF SOCIAL ISSUES 111, 119 (1996).  Before the birth of a child,
men and women generally express a commitment to shared child-care and housework.  See
D. N. Rubel et al., Change in the Marital Relationship During the Transition to First-
Time Motherhood: Effects of Violated Expectations Concerning Division of Household
Labor, 55 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCH. 78, 80 (1988).   Polls likewise
consistently demonstrate that women and men both feel they should spend more time with
their children.  See sources cited in note 13 supra; Richard Morin, With More Equity,
More Sweat: Poll Shows Sexes Agree on Pros and Cons of New Roles, WASH. POST,
Mar. 22, 1998, at A1 (“equally large majorities of working men and women said they . . .
wished they could devote more time to their families”). 
169  See Joseph Pleck, Are Family-Supportive Employer Policies Relevant to
Men?  in MEN WORK, & FAMILY (J.C. HOOD ED., 1993) (finding through interviews that
average leave for men was 5.3 days); Janet Shibley-Hyde, Women and Maternity Leave:
Empirical Data and Policy, 19 PSYCH. OF WOMEN Q. 299, 307 (1995) (noting that
average leave for men is about five days); Janet Shibley-Hyde et al., Fathers and Parental
Leave: Attitudes and Experiences, 14 J. OF FAMILY ISSUES 616, 629 (1993) (finding a
mean leave time of 5 days for surveyed fathers).     
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One way of doing so would be to find ways to encourage, or
induce, men to take leave around the birth of their children, and ultimately
to spend more time caring for their children.  All of the issues so far
discussed indicate that the best means of eradicating persistent labor
market inequalities is to change the work patterns of men, rather than
those of women, something that we have, to date, focused all too little on.
The cumulative disadvantages women face are all directly tied to their
greater devotion to their children, which is directly related to their lower
pay, extreme job segregation, poorer advancement, and greater likelihood
to miss work or drop out of the workforce to care for their children. Yet,
despite  frequent proclamations regarding their desire to spend more time
with their families, men continue to work longer hours while maintaining
their levels of housework and childcare.168  All studies indicate that few
men avail themselves of family leave even when available, and the
average length of the leave that is taken tends to be about five days.169  
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170  Jacobsen & Levin, supra note 83, at 18 (finding persistent and significant
wage loss from extended leaves); Juhn & Murphy, supra note 26, at 93  (noting the large
negative effect the presence of children has on women's employment); David Shapiro &
Frank L. Mott, Long-Term Employment and Earnings of Women in Relation to
Employment Behavior Surrounding the First Birth, 29 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 248,
272 (1994) (finding that consistent labor force attachment of women following childbirth
resulted in wage premium of 19%); Jane Waldfogel, Working Mothers Then and Now: A
Cross-Cohort Analysis of the Effects of Maternity Leave on Women's Pay, in GENDER &
FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE 98 (F. Blau & R. Ehrenberg eds., 1997) (finding that
family status explains approximately fifty percent of the wage gap in 1991).
171  For example, in a 1978 poll, three quarters of the respondents, male and
female alike, thought housework should be shared equally when both partners worked.  See
CROSBY, supra note164, at 148 (1991). In 1986, Working Woman magazine reported that
“Nine in ten Americans today agree that it is important for fathers to spend as much time
with their children as mothers do . . .”  How Working Women Have Changed America,
Working Woman, Nov. 1986, at 134.  
172  In a survey of recent books, sociologist Michael Kimmel observed, “A 1989
New York Times article is typical of the many work-family surveys conducted in recent
years: in it, two-fifths of the fathers interviewed said they would quit their jobs if they
could spend more time with their children.  But the desire to change is often more
rhetorical than real; few men would actually switch places with their nonworking wives if
given the opportunity.”  Michael S. Kimmel, What do Men Want? HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW 50, 54 (Nov.-Dec. 1993) (footnote omitted).
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     As the preceding discussion makes clear, if we can get men to
shoulder more of the home burden, women's equality in the workplace
will improve.170  Getting men to take more leave around the birth of their
children will be an important but difficult task, and in section III I will
explore ways in which we might be able to create incentives for men to
take such leave.  Currently, men proffer a great many excuses for why
they do not take more leave, even though for at least the last twenty years
men have continually expressed an interest in equal parenting and a desire
to take parental leave.171 If there is anything universal in worldwide
patterns relating to parental leave it is that men proclaim a much greater
desire for leave than they appear willing to take.172
   The most common reason men provide for why they cannot take
more leave is that it would be economically infeasible for them to do so
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173  See Hyde et al., supra note 169, at 635 (identifying “economic necessity” as a
reason why men do not take more leave); Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave,
72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1065 (1994)  (“The father’s primary role in providing economic
security functions as a barrier to increased parental involvement in the family.”).
174  See Becker, supra note 77, at 937 (noting the vicious circle that subordinates
women by paying them less and thus increasing the attractiveness of their nonmarket
opportunities). 
175  See Ann E. Winkler, Earnings of Husbands and Wives in Dual Earner
Families, 121 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 8, 10 (1998) (“Data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) show that the proportion of dual-earner couples in which wives
earned more than their husbands increased from 16 percent in 1981 to 23 percent in
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given that they tend to have higher incomes than their wives and would
therefore have to sacrifice more income if they were to take leave.173  But
men’s reluctance to take leave cannot be fully explained by their
economic situation, as men with working wives  appear far more capable
of altering their behavior than they have done.  While some economic
sacrifices would be necessary to share the child rearing burden, taking
leave at the birth of a child would certainly entail fewer costs or
sacrifices, and  whatever economic sacrifices might be necessary would
likely only be short-term.  In fact, taking leave would likely lead to greater
wealth for most men.  The reason it currently makes sense for women to
sacrifice their income, to the extent it makes sense at all, is because they
are paid less than men, but the primary reason they are paid less than men
is that they have the primary responsibility for child rearing.174  If that
cycle were broken, women's earnings would likely rise by as much as
twenty percent, and as long as men's income did not suffer a similar
decline, overall wealth would increase.  Surely, it can be no argument to
prefer men's higher incomes at the expense of women's income, and the
only way this vicious cycle can be derailed is for something to give, and
that must be men's current advantage.
   That said, it is not at all clear that significant economic sacrifices
would be necessary for more men to take longer leaves.  Nearly one
quarter of women now earn more than their husbands reflecting a
substantial increase during the last decade,175 and approximately one-
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
1996.”). 
176  See Blau, supra note 41 at 149.  As noted earlier, wage disparities tend to
increase over time and women tend to begin their careers in at greater salary parity with
men.  See supra note 96.
177  One indication that economics is certainly not the only factor at work is that
very few families even consider the option of having the man stay home or alter his work
hours.  In her study of equal parenting families, Francine Deutsch observed, “[A] taken for
granted quality of inequality with respect to paid work is common among . . . families
[with unequal parenting], even ones where the women had high-powered professions. 
When I asked why it was the mother who cut back to part-time work in many of these
families, the question didn’t seem to make sense to them.  That the father could be the one
to stay home had never been discussed or even given a moment’s thought.”  DEUTSCH,
supra note, at 58.       
178  See Malin, supra note 177, at 1071 (citing studies).  Prior to the passage of the
FMLA, a higher percentage of employers made leave available to their female employees
than to their male employees, but the numbers were not drastically different.  Citing a
study by the Catalyst organization released in 1986, Malin reports that 37% of employers
offered parental leave to fathers while 52% offered such leave to mothers.  Id.
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third of married women between the ages of 25 and 34 have rough wage
parity with their husbands.176  These two facts suggest that a substantial
number of men could take family leave that approximates the leave of
their wives without making economic sacrifices, and a quarter of married
men should be taking longer leaves than their wives if economics were
truly driving the decision.177  Although men often claim they do not have
access to leave, studies  indicate that parental leave is available to men at
a far higher rate than their utilization rates would indicate.  Between 18
to 36 percent of surveyed employers offered parental leave to men even
before the FMLA was implemented.178  Often times the leave was unpaid,
as was also true for the leave offered to women, but men also have access
to their vacation and in some instances sick leave and as many women do,
they could save up their vacation in anticipation of the birth of a child. 
   Another reason men offer for their inability to take leave is that
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179  Id. at 1077 (discussing perceived employer hostility to men taking leave); Janet
Sibley-Hyde et al., supra note 169, 629 (23% of surveyed men thought their supervisors
would be supportive of leave while 63% thought supervisor would respond negatively). 
180  Given that so few men take leave, the evidence of actual retribution is purely
speculative. A contrasting view was recently presented in a study of Norwegian fathers
who took leave, one of the few studies of its kind.  Although the study involved a limited
sample, the authors found that the men who took leave were “admired by their colleagues
and their friends” and did not appear to experience adverse consequences from their
employers.  See Berit Brandth & Elin Kvande, Masculinity & Child Care: The
Reconstruction of Fathering, 46 SOCIOLOGICAL RVW. 293, 309-10 (1998). 
181  See Alison M. Konrad & Kathy Cannings, The Effects of Gender Role
Congruence and Statistical Discrimination on Managerial Advancement, 50 HUMAN
RELATIONS 1305, 1318-19 (1997) (finding that men were rewarded more for long hours
and penalized more than women for their attention to household duties).  Men also appear
to be penalized more than women for working part-time.  See Marianne A. Ferber & Jane
Waldfogel, The Long-Term Consequences of Nontraditional Employment, 121 MONTHLY
LABOR REV. 3, 5 (1998).   
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they fear they will suffer workplace repercussions from their employers.179
This may or may not be true but should not be given undue weight.180  As
discussed extensively above, women currently face substantial penalties
for taking leave, and again, it cannot be argued that men, but only men,
should be spared workplace repercussions when they take leave.  Given
the existing workplace norms, there is some evidence that men suffer
greater penalties for taking leave than women do since their leave taking
violates the prevailing gender norms.181  However, currently employers
are able to exact  stiff penalties against men because so few men take
leave.  If a greater number of men were to take leave, it is unlikely that
employers could persist in retaliating against their employees, as the norm
of leave taking would shift to render those who take leave the norm rather
than the exception.  After all, employers cannot penalize all of their
employees, and if they do so in the form of lower salaries, then it would
be appropriate to view that as a cost the employees are willing to pay, just
as they pay for other workplace benefits, rather than a penalty employers
exact on a few nonconforming employees.
   In addition to the economic considerations, gender norms are
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182  Joseph Pleck argues, “For most men, taking . . . leave is not part of their
conception of their role as father.  Unlike mothers, fathers have not grown up believing
there is a special bond between themselves and their child that requires their being home
full-time during the first months of their child’s life.” Pleck, supra note 169, at 230.
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certainly playing a role, as child rearing continues to be seen as women’s
work and the notion of taking leave to care for a newborn may threaten
the existing roles.182  These issues will have to be challenged if we are to
make greater progress toward workplace equality.  To make more
progress, it will be necessary to find ways to get men to take more leave,
although we should also realize that men are unlikely to do so voluntarily
and will require some greater incentives than currently exist to break up
the existing patterns.   In the next section, I will discuss why the FMLA
is unlikely to contribute to disrupting the existing gender roles, and I will
then explore ways in which family leave might be altered so as to create
the conditions for greater workplace equality.
           II. THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT &
                       GENDER STEREOTYPES. 
   The Family and Medical Leave Act (hereafter "the FMLA" or
"the Act") was intended to ameliorate some of the difficulties parents
encounter in balancing work and family commitments, and it remains the
only federal law intended to aid workers in having and raising children.
In this section, I will explore the effects the FMLA has had to date and
argue that the Act has made a minimal actual difference for working
parents; indeed, I will suggest that to the extent it has made a difference,
it has been to reinforce existing gender inequalities in the workplace.
Given the experience in other countries and states that offer more
generous leave, I also conclude that drastic measures are necessary in
order to facilitate men actually taking leave, and that moving to a system
of paid leave, by itself, will likely be insufficient to chip away at the
prevailing gender norms that help perpetuate workplace inequality.
A.  THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT.
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183   Upon passage, the bill received wide acclaim upon its passage.  See, e.g.,
Editorial, A Victory for Families, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 6, 1993, at 2B; Carl
Leubsdorf, Clinton Signs Bill for Family Leave in Jubilant Ceremony, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Feb. 6, 1993, at 3A; Elizabeth Neuffer, Leave Bill OK’D: Clinton to Sign Today,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 1993, at 1; Paul Richter & Gebe Martinez, Clinton Signs Family
Leave Bill Into Law: President Marks First Victory, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 6, 1993,
at A22; ; Janice Turner, U.S. Family Leave Plan Wins Praise in Canada, TORONTO
STAR, Feb. 6, 1993, at A1.   
184  See supra note 7; STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE 73 (1997)
(“The United States shares with South Africa the distinction of being the only two
developed economies without a national insurance program for families”). 
185  For a thorough discussion of the road to passage see RONALD D. ELVING,
CONFLICT & COMPROMISE (1995).
186  29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(i). 
187  COMMISSION ON FAMILY AND MEDIAL LEAVE, A WORKABLE BALANCE:
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE PRACTICES at 58-61 (1997)
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1.  A Statutory Overview.
   The FMLA was passed in 1993 to great fanfare183 making the
United States one of the last industrial nations to adopt a leave law,
although as discussed in more detail below the American law is among
the least generous of any existing legislation.184  As a symbolic gesture,
President Clinton signed the Act into law as his first official legislative
act, marking the end of a five-year effort to implement a federal leave law,
a process that included two vetoes by President George Bush but which
ended up failing to rise much beyond the symbolic level.185
 
   The FMLA provides twelve weeks of unpaid leave to employees
working for employers having fifty or more employees.  In order to be
eligible for the leave, the employee must have worked for the employer
for at least one year, and worked for that employer at least 1,250 hours
during the previous twelve months.186  Despite these restrictions, it is
estimated that the Act covers approximately sixty percent of the nation's
private sector workforce, even though only about eleven percent of the
nation's employers are covered.187   Public employers are also bound by
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(hereafter "A WORKABLE BALANCE").  Of the covered employees, approximately 46.5%
have met the statutory requirements rendering them eligible to take leave.  Id. at 60. 
188  Id. at 61.
189  29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). 
190  29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1).  The statute exempts from this requirement those who
are paid among the top ten percent of the workforce if restoring them would cause
"substantial and grievous economic harm."  29 U.S.C. § 2614 (b).  It is also not necessary
to restore a worker to a position that would have been eliminated if the person had not been
on leave.
191  29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2)(A).  Another important aspect of the legislation is that
an employer must continue to provide health benefits during the leave, which the employee
can be required to repay should the employee fail to return to work from her leave.   Id. at 
§ 2614(c)(1).
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the statutory provisions, which total number of covered employees to 66
percent of the workforce, with approximately 55 percent of employees
statutorily eligible to take leave.188  
   Under the terms of the statute, leave is available to an employee
to care for a newborn, newly-adopted or foster child, for one's own
serious illness, as well as to care for a seriously ill spouse, parent or
child.189  The statute also provides for job-protection in the form of a
guarantee that at the end of the leave the employee will be returned to the
same or substantially equivalent position, with some limited exceptions.190
Importantly, the leave is unpaid, and the employer can require that an
employee utilize her accumulated vacation or sick leave prior to taking the
statutory leave to care for a new child that has been brought into the
family.191  
 
2.  The Effect of the FMLA.
   In order to assess the effect and importance of the FMLA, it is
necessary to first know what kind of leave was generally available before
the Act was passed.  This task is made somewhat difficult because where
provided, maternity leave was typically not offered through formal
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192  For a discussion of the variety of plans see Olivia S. Mitchell, Work and
Family Benefits, at 270-71, in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE
(Francine D. Blau & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, eds., 1997).  Another reason it was often
difficult to assess the availability of leave is that many of the studies were conducted by
advocacy groups intent on influencing the legislation.  Not surprisingly, employer-
sponsored studies tended to suggest inflated levels of coverage, as well as what have
proved to be grossly inflated estimates of the cost of extending leave, while employee-
sponsored studies indicated a paucity of benefits, and likewise typically underestimated the
costs of additional leave legislation.  For example, the National Association of Wholesalers
survey, conducted in 1990 in the midst of the legislative battle, found that 54% of their
members offered leave comparable to FMLA leave, a high estimate considering that two-
thirds of the surveyed employers employed under 50 employees.  See NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF WHOLESALERS, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SURVEY (1990).  In perhaps the
most well-known study, the Chamber of Commerce estimated compliance with the FMLA
would cost approximately $13 billion a year.  See Michelle Rose Marks, Party Politics
and Family Policy: The Case of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 J. OF FAMILY
ISSUES 55, 59 (1997) (discussing the study and its influence).  An employee-sponsored
survey, on the other hand, found that there would be no increase in cost for more than two
thirds of employers when it came to training, health insurance or unemployment insurance,
and no administrative costs reported by more than half of employers.  See JOHN T. BOND
ET AL., BEYOND THE PARENTAL LEAVE DEBATE: THE IMPACT OF LAWS IN FOUR STATES,
at iii (1991).  The employee-sponsored survey turned out to offer the most accurate
prediction.  See infra notes 209-10.
193  Some of the data is difficult to interpret because it surveyed employers of all
sizes.  See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
SURVEY (1993).
-71-
“maternity leave” policies  but instead was afforded in various other
ways, such as through sick leave or disability policies, or informal leave,
which made it difficult to know who had access to what kind of leave.192
 The federal government, however, periodically surveys employers to
determine the kind and form of benefits they provide to employees. These
estimates suggested that a majority of large employers, defined as those
employing more than 100 employees, provided some form of leave that
would enable women, but not necessarily men, to take time off around the
birth of a child.  Paid sick leave was the most common form of leave
available, and unpaid maternity leave was also provided by a substantial
segment of employers.193  Nearly ninety percent of full-time employees of
large firms also had access to disability plans that included coverage for
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194  See Jane Waldfogel, supra note 170, at 94 (citing government statistics).
195  See Christopher J. Ruhm, The Family and Medical Leave Act, 11 J. OF ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 175, 182 (1997).
196  See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 130, at 2190 (“The smaller firms
that are not covered by the [FMLA] are the ones that are least likely to offer such benefits
currently.”); Shelley M. MacDermid et al., Organizational Size and Work-Family Issues,
111, 120, in THE EVOLVING WORLD OF WORK AND FAMILY: NEW STAKEHOLDERS, NEW
VOICES (Marcie Pitts-Catsouples & Bradley K. Gougins eds. 1992) (noting that large
firms offer more benefits and are more willing to accommodate flexible work practices,
particularly for professional employees).    
197  See Jutta M. Joesch, Paid Leave and the Timing of Women’s Employment
Before and After Birth, 59 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAMILY 1008, 1009-10 (1997) (finding 61
days of paid leave were available for those who had at least five years of tenure with their
employer).   For a discussion of the status of leave prior to the passage of the FMLA see U.
S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM TO LARGE FIRMS 1989, at 2
(Bulletin No. 2363 1990). .  
198  The laws are described in more detail in WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,
STATE LAW AND REGULATIONS GUARANTEEING EMPLOYEES THEIR JOBS AFTER FAMILY
AND MEDICAL LEAVES (1993), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, STATE MATERNITY/FAMILY
LEAVE LAW (1993), and are discussed in A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 187, at 44-
49.
-72-
pregnancy,194 as did ninety-six percent of state and local employees.195
As the figures indicate, large employers were far more likely to offer
leave than smaller employers, and professional employees tended to have
better access to leave than clerical employees.196  Those who had worked
for medium to large-size employers for at least five years were estimated
to have benefits that averaged about nine weeks of  of available leave at
full pay.197
   In addition to the availability of employer-provided leave, at the
time the FMLA was enacted, thirty-four states, as well as Puerto Rico and
Washington, D.C., had some type of leave legislation in place.  The state
statutes varied in their provisions -- some offering more generous
protection than was ultimately enacted by the FMLA while others offered
less -- and five states made some form of wage replacement available
through temporary disability insurance laws.198  A number of studies
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199  See EILEEN TRZCINSKI & WILLIAM T. ALPERT, LEAVE POLICIES IN SMALL
BUSINESS: FINDINGS FROM THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION EMPLOYEE LEAVE
SURVEY (1990); Eileen Trzcinski & M.Finn Stevenson, A Response to Arguments Against
Parental Leave: Findings From the Connecticut Survey of Parental Leave Policies, 52 J.
OF MARRIAGE & FAMILY 445 (1992); TOWERS PERRIN, INC., FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE PROGRAMS: BEFORE AND AFTER THE NEW FEDERAL LAW (1993).   
200  See Suzanne M. Crampton & Jitendra M. Mishra, Family and Medical Leave
Legislation: Organizational Policies and Strategies, 24 PUBLIC PERSONNEL MGT. 271,
274 (1995) (noting that “the number of companies with some type of leave policy already
in place prior to the passage of the FMLA has been estimated to be up to 89 percent . . .”);
Marks, supra note 192, at 65 (noting that “[t]he final bill demanded nothing more of most
businesses . . . than what they provided already.”).  
201  One survey concentrated on a random sample of private employers, while the
other sampled a random group of employees from both the public and private sector.  The
Employer Survey, conducted by Westat sampled a national, random group of employers,
interviewing respondents from 1,206 worksites.  See A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note
187, at 23.  The Employee Survey, conducted by the University of Michigan Survey
Research Center, targeted employees aged 18 and over who lived in the United States, and
had been employed for pay any time within the last 18 months between January 1, 1994 to
the Summer of 1995 when the survey was conducted.  Id. at 24.   
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sought to measure the extent the leave laws were utilized, and all of the
studies indicated very low utilization rates, typically from one to three
percent of employees annually.199 
B.  The FMLA in Action.
1.  The Use of the FMLA.
   
   Analyzing the pre-existing law in this detail helps expose the
benefits the FMLA actually provided, and places the law in proper
perspective.  Recent data confirm that the FMLA provided employees
with little more than was previously available, with the largely unintended
exception of providing some additional unpaid sick leave to employees.200
Although the statute is still young, the Commission on Family and
Medical Leave recently commissioned two comprehensive studies to
determine the use and cost of the FMLA, and those studies offer
important and revealing insights into the Act. 201  The surveys sought to
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202  Id. at 83.  There is some indication that employer compliance with the FMLA
was limited immediately following its passage which could suppress the number of
individuals who took leave.  See Sue Shellenbarger, Many Employers Flout Family &
Medical Leave Law, WALL STREET J., July 26, 1994, at B1 (reporting that one study
found that up to 40% of employers failed to provide required leave). 
203  The Employee Survey found that 16.8% of employees surveyed took leave for
a reason covered by the FMLA but only 7% of that group took leave under the FMLA. 
See A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 187, at 84. 
204  Id. at 92.
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determine how employers and employees had responded to the passage
of the Act, as well as measuring to the extent practicable its
accompanying costs and benefits, and these studies highlight the
limitations of the FMLA.  
   Both surveys found relatively low utilization rates of FMLA
benefits, levels that were consistent with previous studies. The employer
survey indicated that 3.6 out of every 100 employees at private-sector
worksites took some form of FMLA leave, while the employee survey
found a utilization rate of 2 percent.202  Although the rates may appear
low, in absolute numbers they represent as many as 2.5 million employees
who took FMLA leave during the 18 months of the survey.  Equally
important, these numbers represent those who took leave under the Act,
a far larger number of employees took leave for a reason covered by the
FMLA but only a small fraction (7 percent in the employee survey) took
leave formally under the FMLA, as most employees continued to utilize
other forms of available leave, such as their sick leave or disability
insurance.203
   The surveys also collected data on who took leave for what
reason.  Women took significantly more leave than men (58.2% compared
to 41.8%), and the largest group of leave takers fell into the age group of
between 35 and 49 years old.204  This latter fact suggests that much of the
leave was not likely related to the birth or adoption of a child, a fact that
was confirmed by the survey results.  Indeed, nearly sixty percent of those
who took leave did so for their own health related problem, and only 17.1
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205  Id. at 94.  Somewhat ironically, the employee survey found a higher level of
leave related to child birth or adoption in worksites that were not covered by the FMLA,
which accounted for approximately 21% of the FMLA related leave.  Id.
206  Id. at 95-96.
207  Id. at 97.  The vast majority of employees returned to work following their
leave, with approximately 5.6% of all leave-takers failing to return.  Id. at 113.
208  Thirty-seven percent of those who took leave to care for a newborn returned to
work within seven days.  Id. at 97.  In contrast, 42.4% of maternity-disability leave lasted
at least twelve weeks.  Id. at 269, Table 5.D. There was also a small group of individuals
who indicated that they were unable to take FMLA leave despite their need for the leave. 
Just under four percent of the surveyed employees indicated that they needed leave but did
not take it, with nearly two-thirds of those employees indicating they did not take leave
because they could not afford to. Id. at 98-99.  Significantly, less than ten percent of the
needed but untaken leave was related to the birth or adoption of a child, as most of the
untaken leave was to care for a sick child or parent or for one's own health problem.    Id.
at 99.
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percent took leave for reasons related to the birth or adoption of a child.205
   The studies found no significant difference between men and
women on the rate or length of taking parental leave,206 and the median
length of leave was ten days, though there was substantial variance among
the leave takers.  Seventy-five percent of those who took leave returned
within 35 days, and about twelve percent of employees of covered sites
took more than twelve weeks of.207 Somewhat surprisingly, a significant
portion of FMLA leave to care for newborns lasted less than one week,
although leave defined as "maternity-leave" tended to last substantially
longer.208  
   Finally, the surveys suggested the costs of the FMLA to
employers appear to be quite modest.  More than two-thirds of employers
covered the employee out on leave with other employees, and the
employees who were replaced by a permanent hire tended to fall into the
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209  Id. at 102-03.
210  Id. at 131, Figure 6.4  Somewhat paradoxically given the exemption for
employers with fewer than 50 employees,  nearly twice as many larger employers reported
moderate or large cost effects than smaller employers.  Id. at 126.
211  See Marks, supra note 192, at 65 (noting that the bill offered little more than
most business provided); Ruhm, supra note 195, at 177 (finding that the FMLA primarily
symbolic).  Ruth Colker recently lamented, "[The] only solace [for low-income workers] is
that, if they work for a large employer, they, at least, will have a job to which they can
return after taking the most minimal possible medical leave."  Ruth Colker, Pregnancy,
Parenting, and Capitalism, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 61, 62 (1997);
212  See A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 187, at 107 (reporting that 46.7% of
employees reported receiving full wage replacement and 19.6% received partial pay).
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lowest income category.209  Interestingly, more employers indicated that
the benefits of the Act, in terms of increased productivity, outweighed
whatever costs they incurred.210 
   2.  Evaluating the Effect of the Statute.    
   Based on this early survey data, it appears that the FMLA has
had its greatest impact by allowing employees to take unpaid sick leave
for a limited time, leave that may not have been available without the
legislation.  In some ways, this finding should come as little surprise, as
with respect to leave relating to the birth or adoption of a child, the Act
largely replicated what the market was already providing –  unpaid leave
to those who worked for large employees.211 Certainly there is no
indication that the FMLA has greatly, or even mildly, facilitated the
balancing of work and family commitments, nor is there any evidence that
it has induced men to play a greater role at the birth or adoption of a child,
especially given how very short the leaves tend to be.  The surveys also
suggest that most people who are taking substantial amounts of leave are
doing so under non-FMLA provided policies: nearly fifty percent of
employees reported receiving full wage replacement for the leave, while
another twenty percent  indicated receiving partial pay, neither of which
is required by the Act.212 
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213  Katherine Karr Kaitin quotes advocates for the FMLA as noting the political
reality against paid leave and asking, "[S]hould we have done nothing or should we have
gone with unpaid leave?"  Kaitin concludes, "The coalition members did choose to do
something, believing that any leave was better than none at all."  Katherine Karr Kaitin,
Congressional Response to Families in the Workplace: The Family Medical Leave Act of
1987-88, at 105, in MORE THAN KISSING BABIES? (Francine H. Jacobs & Margery W.
Davies, eds. 1994).  See also Anya Bernstein, Inside or Outside? The Politics of Family
and Medical Leave, 25 POLICY STUDIES J. 87, 90 (1997) (quoting one of the legislation’s
proponents as suggesting that “half a loaf is better than none.”).
214  See Bernstein, supra note 213 at 91 (arguing that interest groups are often
motivated by what the author labels “credit-claiming” incentives). 
-77-
   The fact that the FMLA largely replicates what employers were
already providing raises the question why the Act was seen as so critically
important to the workplace, and why its advocates were willing to settle
for such a weak form of parental leave.  One participant in the battle to
enact the FMLA, while acknowledging its limitations, suggested that
advocacy groups persevered under the theory that some legislation was
better than no legislation.213  As a statement reflecting the interests of the
advocacy groups, this very well may have been true and may have made
for a sound decision as their legislative achievements could later be touted
to their constituencies.214  The statute symbolic significance — 
representing first federal legislation addressing family leave —  should
also not be overlooked in evaluating the merits of the Act.
   But symbolic legislation garners little more than symbolic relief,
and may carry with it significant negative effects.  It is far from clear that
the interests of women in the workplace would be furthered better by any
legislation, including that which was ultimately passed, than by no
legislation given the potential for what might be termed significant
negative externalities from the legislation.  One of the dangers associated
with passing a weak bill is that once federal legislation is enacted, family
leave legislation may removed as items of importance for state legislatures
or unions,which may have provided more hospitable venues for significant
reform than the ineffectual federal law.  Indeed, this seems to have
occurred.  Since the passage of the FMLA, no significant state legislation
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215   The Daily Labor Report publishes an annual listing of all significant state
labor legislation enacted during the previous year, and a review of the each list published
since 1993 indicates that there has been no significant new legislation.  Several states have
amended their leave legislation to permit parents to attend parent-teacher conferences,
though not even all of that rather limited legislation has been successfully passed.  See
Maine Governor Vetoes Minimum Wage Hike, Expanded Family Leave, Higher Comp
Levels, DAILY LABOR RPT., June 17, 1999, at A-10 (describing veto of legislation to allow
parents 24 hours to care for children or attend parent-teacher conferences).
216  See Bernstein, supra note 213, at 97 (describing proposals).
217  The President recently has suggested that states should be allowed to use
unemployment surpluses to subsidize family leave, an idea that would provide some wage
replacement, though at the low levels currently available for the unemployed, and would
likely provide some benefit to those who currently do not have access to paid leave.  See
John M. Broder, Clinton Proposes Using Surpluses to Extend Family Leave Benefits, N.
Y. TIMES, May 24, 1999, at A4.  The President’s suggestion came in a graduation speech
in a time of historically low unemployment levels and it is too early to tell whether this
traditional day of optimism will bear fruit.  
218  It is easy to see how this preclusive effect can occur.  Employers tend to offer
generous benefits as a way of attracting employees and maintaining a competitive edge in
the labor market.  However, once the law creates a federal right, that right can become
what employees expect, and therefore employers may be less likely to use leave as a means
to attract employees.  Better data will be necessary, however, before we can determine
whether this is what in fact has occurred.  
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has been enacted,215 and the only federal efforts have been to expand the
Act to include unpaid leave for such things as parent-teacher meetings and
efforts to extend the Act to smaller employers.216  These are both worthy
goals but surely limited in their aspirations, and there has been no
discussion of moving toward guaranteeing paid leave.217  
   The legislation may also have preempted the development of
more friendly policies in the private sector.  Prior to the passage of the
FMLA, there appeared to be a modest trend by private employers to
provide increasingly generous paid leave policies, a trend that now seems
to have stalled as the federal legislation has become the ceiling of
benefits.218  The only positive note in the aftermath of the legislation is
that unions appear to be seeking greater leave benefits in their collective
bargaining efforts and publicizing their efforts as a way to attract new
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219  The AFL-CIO includes a section on their web page pronouncing their success
in bargaining for greater leave.  See Bargaining to Expand the Family and Medical Leave
Act, which can be found at http://www.aflcio.org/women/fsbargain.htm. 
220  See supra note 137.
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members.219       
   The early experience with the FMLA, as well as the substantial
limitations of the existing statute, definitively suggests that something
more needs to be done.  This is especially true if the goal is to encourage
more men to take parental leave, a goal the current statute is inadequately
structured to address.  In the next section, I will discuss several ways in
which the statute might be amended in order to create more gender
equality in the workplace, though it will be important to first discuss some
of the proposals that have been offered to address the persistent problems.
III.  BRINGING EQUALITY TO THE WORKPLACE.
Creating a successful national family leave policy remains the key
to reducing workplace inequality for women.  As discussed in more detail
below, there are a number of ways in which the statute might be amended
with an aim toward breaking up the gendered divisions that continue to
demarcate both work and home lives.  Before discussing these proposals,
however, I want to spend some time analyzing a recent tax reform
proposal that is largely intended to address the same problem I have been
discussing in this article – namely, the persistence of gender inequality in
the workplace.      
A.  The Idea of Tax Reform.        
   As previously noted, it is often suggested that it is economically
rational for women to leave the labor force when they have children, and
that, economic considerations primarily determine that decision.220  In his
engaging recent book, Taxing Women, Edward McCaffery argues that
women leave the workforce because the tax system, along with their
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap
221 EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997) (hereafter TAXING WOMEN). 
McCaffery’s book is primarily based on two articles that previously appeared in law
reviews, Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination,
Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595 (1993); Taxation and the
Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Bias in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983
(1993).   
222  MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN, supra note 221, at 137-60 & 178-82.
223  Id. at 276-80.  
224  For recent commentaries on McCaffery’s argument see Anne L. Alstott, Tax
Policy & Feminism: Competing Goals & Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2002,
2018-19 (1996); Lawrence Zelenak, Tax and the Married Woman, 70 SOUTHERN CALIF.
L. REV. 1021 (1997).
225  MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN, supra note 221, at 179-82.  Most of the
studies McCaffery relies on interpret data from the mid-1980s or earlier.  Id.
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lower incomes when compared to men, compels them to forego their
market wage in order to care for their children.221  His primary concern is
with the system of joint tax filing, which he contends imposes penalties
on secondary income earners, a phenomenon that disproportionately
affects women given that women tend to earn less than their husbands.222
McCaffery therefore proposes that the tax system be restructured to tax
married women at a lower rate than others in order to create sufficient
incentives to encourage more women to enter, or remain in, the labor
force.223  
   This is an intriguing idea, and McCaffery deserves much credit
for having sparked a lively debate regarding the gendered nature of the tax
system.224  It is far less certain, however, that his proposal would produce
the results he suggests, for at least two reasons.  First, his theory is
premised on a weak empirical foundation.  The essence of McCaffery’s
argument is that women’s labor force attachment is quite elastic relative
to wages, whereas men’s attachment is inelastic and he bases his
assumption on several older studies.225   More recent empirical work casts
doubt on this critical assumption, as it appears that the elasticity of
women’s labor force attachment is increasingly becoming more like
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226  For example, in their study of working women, Klerman and Leibowitz
concluded that higher wages did not increase the number of women who returned to work. 
The authors concluded, “There is little support for the hypothesis that higher wages induce
women to return to work sooner after giving birth than do lower wages.”  Klerman &
Leibowitz, supra note 84, at 289.  The authors did find  that higher wage women were
significantly more likely to be on leave, although that leave was also likely to be unpaid. 
Id. at 294.   Another recent study found that women’s elasticity is much lower than had
originally been documented, and depends greatly upon the presence and number of children
as well as the education level of the woman.  See Juhn & Murphy, supra note, 26, at 86-92
.  See also Alstott, supra note 224, at 2018-19 (critiquing studies documenting increased
female labor supply in response to increased wages).  
227  See ROBERT MAX JACKSON, DESTINED FOR EQUALITY: THE INEVITABLE RISE
OF WOMEN’S STATUS 97 (1998) (“The primary trend of wives joining the work force has
been overwhelmingly independent of husband’s economic status.”); Maria Cancian,
Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk, Working Wives & Family Income Inequality
Among Married Couples, in UNEVEN TIDES: RISING INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 198 &
Table 6.1 (S. Danziger & P. Gottschalk eds. 1993) (between 1968 and 1988 the largest
group of white women entering the workforce were those married to high income men); 
Juhn & Murphy, supra note 26, at 89 (women’s employment increased most dramatically
at upper income ranges).   
228  Jane Waldfogel, supra note 7,at 141.  Amy Christian has recently suggested
that a woman earning $30,000 would likely have a net loss of income when expenses are
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men’s.226  Recent data also indicates that the women whose husband's
have high incomes are entering the workforce at a faster rate than those
at the bottom of the scale, a fact that is difficult to reconcile with
McCaffery's theory.227 
   Relatedly, McCaffery fails to provide supporting data for his
argument that it is cost effective for women to stay at home to care for
their children.  Taxes unquestionably eat away at secondary incomes,  but
it would only make financial sense for women to leave the workforce if
their net pay was so low as either not to cover expenses such as childcare,
or sufficiently low to satisfy the worker's preference for nonwork.
Neither assumption has been empirically established. Jane Waldfogel has
recently calculated that child care costs average approximately 22 percent
of female earnings, leaving substantial income even after accounting for
taxes.228  McCaffery would likely respond by suggesting that the elasticity
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accounted for, suggesting that it is economically rational for most women to remain at
home.  See Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and
Addressing the Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J. OF LAW & POLITICS 241, 289-92
(1997).  However, Christian’s costs estimates are grossly inflated calculations she never
actually seeks to document.  More to the point, Christian’s argument is plainly refuted by
the presence of millions of working mothers in the workforce who earn less than $30,000,
surely an indication that they are not losing money by working.     
229  It is somewhat surprising that neither McCaffery nor those who have
commented on his proposal discuss its constitutionality.  Creating an explicitly gender
based tax system would certainly be subject to a constitutional challenge that would have 
to meet the intermediate level of scrutiny.  As I discuss below, I believe an argument can
be made supporting the constitutionality of a similar program but it is not something that
ought to be assumed.  See note 242 infra.    
-82-
of women’s decision to work suggests that the decision is not entirely
determined by the economic feasibility of staying home, but again,
without more support for the underlying claim of elasticity this response
fails to overcome the empirical objections.   
   Additionally, embedded within McCaffery’s analysis is the vice
identified earlier, namely that the choice to sacrifice a woman's income is
economically rational and should be treated as such.  It is important to
highlight the circularity of this position: the primary reason a woman's
income is lower than men's is that she is expected to leave the workforce
to care for children, and fulfilling that expectation is the best way to
ensure that the gender income inequality persists.  Even if the strategy
makes sense on an individual family level, it may reduce our social
welfare by suppressing the wages of women, which may provide a strong
argument for governmental action to alter the existing patterns.  Indeed,
changing the work patterns of men would seem preferable to adopting the
controversial, and constitutionally arousing,229 change in the tax code,
particularly given the empirical limitations of the theory.   
B.  Fixing FMLA with an Eye on Equality.
   In this section I want to discuss several ways in which the FMLA
might be altered so as to alleviate some of the workplace disadvantage
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230  A number of countries have allowed parents to share a specified amount of
leave, but when they do so mothers utilize the vast majority of the leave time. See SANDRA
FRIEDMAN, WOMEN AND THE LAW 219-20 (1997) (discussing limits of shared leave). 
231  This seems to be an upward estimate based on experiences within Sweden and
American companies where leave has been encouraged.  Professor Malin seems to suggest
that the numbers could be even higher, though his rationalizations for why men do not
currently take leave accumulate to a point beyond credibility.  It seems incredible, for
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women continue to experience, and to help change the governing norms.
However, rather than provide detailed policy proposals, I want to treat
this section as more tentative and exploratory as a way of beginning a
conversation.  This seems to make sense not only because some of the
proposals likely have little chance of being adopted in the near future but
also because amending the FMLA should be seen as only one facet of a
more comprehensive reform strategy.  Surely at this stage of our
experience, it would be foolish to think there is any single or easy fix to
what is an enormously complicated and deep-seated problem.        
1.  The Need for Paid Leave.  
   There are various ways in which a more equitable family leave
system might be obtained but all of them will require some form of paid
leave.  Ideally, the twelve weeks of currently mandated unpaid leave
would be transformed into paid leave, but if that proves infeasible, at least
in the short term, then a minimum of six weeks of paid leave for men and
women following the birth or adoption of the child should be made
available.  As a way of equalizing leave taking to some degree, it should
be mandated that leave be taken in its entirety or not at all.  In other
words, a parent would have to take the full six weeks in order to receive
any paid leave, and the leave would belong exclusively to one parent
without the possibility of sharing the leave between parents.230  If this
policy were adopted, consistent with the existing mandate, six additional
weeks of unpaid leave should also be made available to parents.
   Providing six weeks of paid leave should induce some fathers to
take parental leave, perhaps as many as twenty  percent.231  Additionally,
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example, that men may need to avail themselves of sexual harassment doctrine to counter
the hostile work environments that confont men who try to take leave.  See Malin, supra
note 177, at 1089-93 (arguing that sexual harassment law would provide a remedy for men
who work in a "FMLA hostile environment).    
232  See text accompanying notes 173-82. 
233  This is one reason why the proposal by Sam Issacharoff and Elaine
Rosenblum to provide for a payroll tax to pay for family leave fails to go far enough.  See
Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 130, at 2214-20.  Their model for funding for
twelve weeks of pregnancy leave is based on the Canadian model and borrows
substantially from unemployment insurance schemes.  Id. at 2216-17.  This model is likely
to reduce the gender gap somewhat by making it easier for women to return to work after
having a child, and therefore create a more continuous work career.  Id. at 2164
(emphasizing importance of continuous labor force attachment).  See also Waldfogel,
supra note 7, at 151-52 (arguing that providing coverage to women might reduce gap
associated with having children by 40%).  
234  As noted previously, men generally take about five days of leave, even though
many men have access to some form of paid leave.  See supra at text accompanying note
169 and sources cited therein.  Based upon a survey of leave patterns in the United States
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and not insignificantly, it may help settle the question of whether men
actually want to be involved more directly in child rearing, as their current
excuses for not taking leave would be substantially depleted.232  With paid
leave in place, men’s work situation would be much like that currently
confronted by women, and to the extent they suffered adverse
consequences for taking leave, they would have recourse to legal action.
   Nevertheless, although providing paid leave for longer periods of
time would certainly aid those women who were trying to balance work
and family issues, there is little reason to believe such legislation, by
itself, would reduce the inequality women face in the workplace.233  Even
with paid leave legislation, it is unlikely that substantial numbers of men
will take the guaranteed level, particularly if they have accrued vacation
time available that will allow them to satisfy their apparent preference for
a short leave time.  Experiences from countries that offer more generous
leave policies demonstrate that men remain reluctant to take leave even
when the leave is paid.  With the important, and partial, exception of
Sweden, discussed below, men rarely avail themselves of leave,234 and
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and Sweden, Joseph Pleck concludes, “[F]or whatever reason, it is clear that fathers will
take advantage of infant care leave to a far lesser extent than mothers.  Infant-care leave
policies may be gender-neutral in principle but they will not work in a gender-neutral way
in practice.”  Joseph H. Pleck, Fathers and Infant Care Leave, in THE PARENTAL LEAVE
CRISIS 184-85 (Edward F. Zigler & Meryl Frank eds. 1989).   
235  For discussions of Sweden’s experience as a possible model for the United
States see LINDA HAAS, EQUAL PARENTHOOD & SOCIAL POLICY: A STUDY OF PARENTAL
LEAVE IN SWEDEN (1992); Siv Gustafsson & Frank P. Stafford, Three Regimes of Child
Care: The United States, the Netherlands, and Sweden, in SOCIAL PROTECTION VERSUS
ECONOMIC FLEXIBILITY: IS THERE A TRADE-OFF? at 333 (Rebecca M. Blank ed., 1995);
Arielle Horman Grill, Comment, The Myth of Unpaid Leave: Can the United States
Implement A Paid Leave Policy Based on the Swedish Model? 17 COMP. LABOR L.J. 373
(1996); Malin, supra note 177, at 1075-77. 
236  See Joseph P. Allen, European Infant Care Leaves: Foreign Perspectives on
the Integration of Work & Family Roles, in THE PARENTAL LEAVE CRISIS 264 (Edward F.
Zigler & Meryl Frank eds. 1989); Linda Haas, Nurturing Fathers and Working Mothers:
Changing Gender Roles in Sweden, in MEN, WORK & FAMILY 248 (1993); Grill, supra
note 235, at 377-78.
237  Haas, supra note 236, at 249.  The figures Haas cite are for children born in
1989.
238  See Gustafasson & Stafford, supra note 235, at 348. 
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even in Sweden the leave legislation has brought fewer benefits than is
often assumed.
   Sweden is widely cited as having a model leave law, one that has
achieved some success in getting men to take leave.235   Based on data
from the late 1980s, approximately 44 percent of Swedish men take
parental leave with the average leave lasting 45 days.236  Although these
figures are impressive relative to other nations, it is nevertheless important
to place them in context.  Nearly all Swedish women take leave, and their
leave averages 260 days, nearly nine months or six times as long as the
men’s leave.237  In addition to the unequal lengths of leave, most mothers
work part-time, at least on their initial return from work, and women with
children in the United States are twice as likely to work full-time as
similarly situated women in Sweden.238  Women in Sweden also remain
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239  See Dana Milbank, Sweden: Laws Help Mom, But They Hurt Her Career,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 26, 1995, at B1 (“Women hold only 8% of private-sector
managerial jobs, and they are all but absent from top management.”).   
240  For example, a Swedish banker commented, “[The leaves are] good for the
fathers and mothers, and that must be good for the bank.”  Joseph P. Allen, supra note
236, at 255 (citation omitted). 
241  See Gustafsson & Stafford, supra note 235, at 346.
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largely absent from managerial provisions even with the generous family
leave policies in place.239     
   Despite the persistence of these inequalities, Sweden remains an
important case study, if for no other reason than the successful way in
which the country has been able to incorporate family leave, and child
care, into the accepted employment package.240 Sweden enjoys
widespread political support for extended parental leave, and publicly-
financed daycare facilities, both of which have been accepted as part of
the comprehensive protection policies that characterize the Swedish social
welfare system.241  The Swedish model may not translate directly to the
United States but it does seem clear that any successful program of family
leave will require broad based political support, something that appears
to exist in the United States though the policies we have implemented fall
short of creating an adequate policy.   
2.  Requiring Men to Take Leave.
   Given the likely limited effect of paid leave policies, it will be
necessary to take stronger measures to induce greater levels of leave
taking.  One such proposal would be to require men to take six weeks of
leave. This could be done on a temporary basis –  say for five years –  as
a means of trying to change the structured patterns that continue to
replicate our gender inequalities through the preservation of gender
norms.   This suggestion may sound rather extreme, yet the premise
underlying the idea is that currently women are effectively required to
take leave, and the legislation would simply balance that socially imposed
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242  Without going into detail, I will sketch an argument that a gender-specific
requirement that men take leave would be constitutional (which is, of course, quite
different from saying that the Supreme Court would uphold such a policy).  Gender-based
restrictions need only satisfy the Court’s intermediate scrutiny, which requires establishing
that the program was designed to serve an important governmental objective and that the
chosen means were substantially related to the achievement of the objective.  See
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).  In the area of gender
classification, one of the Court’s central concerns is that the legislation not perpetuate
gender stereotypes.  Id. at 725.  Requiring men to take leave could run afoul of the Court's
concern with gender stereotypes; however, in this instance the act is based on an empirical,
and well documented, reality rather than a stereotype, namely that men rarely take leave
and that the gendered nature of leave taking substantially contributes to  labor market
inequality.  The harm women suffer as a result of the existing patterns is also well-
documented, and both of these facts should lend credence to the government's claim that
the legislation is aimed at advancing an important governmental interest, namely gender
equality.  Similarly, it should be possible to establish that mandatory leave is the only
means possible to break up the patterns, and if the statute includes a defined time period,
the Court should be even more receptive to upholding the provision as a temporary
measure aimed at correcting a manifest imbalance in the workplace.  Cf. Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding gender preference).  Let me
reiterate that this is simply a brief and by no means conclusive or persuasive explication of
what is a complicated and by necessity  nuanced argument.          
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condition with one that was legally imposed.
   There are two strong arguments in favor of a mandatory leave
policy.  First, such a system, if properly enforced, would in all likelihood
work, and may strongly influence the prevailing norms regarding working
parents, as both men and women would be expected to leave the
workplace for a definite period of time following the birth or adoption of
a child.  Second, on a purely pragmatic level, it may be the only policy
that would succeed in inducing large numbers of men to take leave.    
   A number of objections to a mandatory paternity leave policy
would likely arise, including questions regarding its constitutionality on
both due process and equal protection grounds.  Although I believe that
a well-developed program should survive constitutional scrutiny,242 a
gender neutral proposal may garner greater support with very nearly
identical results. Because most, if not all, women would take the available
paid leave, requiring such leave of both men and women would ameliorate
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243  A gender neutral policy still must satisfy the Court’s rational basis scrutiny,
but given that the policy would be intended to serve the important goal of reducing gender
inequality, this should not be a difficult standard to meet.  Similarly, whatever liberty
concerns might arise should be mitigated by the realization that large numbers of workers,
truck drivers and airline pilots for example, are prevented from working for specific
periods.  See 14 C.F.R. § 121.481(c) (1999) (restricting pilots to flying 8 hours during 24
consecutive hours); 49 C.F.R. § 395.3 (limiting hours drivers can work).  If men were
required to take leave, they could not be required to engage in any particular activities,
such as childcare, but would instead be free to do whatever they pleased other than work
for their employer.               
244  See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (requiring women about
to give birth to take leave of indeterminate length); Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974) (requiring leave five months before expected birth and at least three
months after). 
245  The federal government currently has a number of contract set-aside programs
in place.  The Small Business Administration administers the program known as Section
8(a), which promotes government contracting with minority businesses.  See 15 U.S.C. §
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the constitutional concerns while affecting the choices of very few
women.243  This form of a gender neutral proposal may, however, harken
to the days when pregnant women were often required to leave the
workplace both before and after giving birth,244 and for this reason may
prove politically undesirable. There are also important questions regarding
administrability, in particular whether the statute would apply to all
fathers, only those who are married to the mother, or who are living at
home with the mother.  For these reasons, it is important to propose
additional incentives to get men to take leave that can be accomplished
through less drastic means, as discussed more fully in the next section.
3.  Creating a Set-Aside Program for Family Leave.
   Perhaps the most promising of the less drastic measures would
be to tie federal contracts to employer's records regarding the utilization
rates of their parental leave policies.  For example, employers who have
a strong record of men taking leave, one that exceeds comparable
employers, might be incorporated into the existing government programs
for providing contracts to disadvantaged businesses.245  Again, to meet
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644 (1999).  For a comprehensive overview of federal affirmative action programs,
including various set-aside progrms see GEORGE STEPHANOPOLOUS & CHRISTOPHER
EDLEY, JR., AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REVIEW: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1995).      
246  If this kind of program were implemented, an employer would submit
documentation showing what percentage of its employees were eligible for the leave, the
number who took the leave, and the length of the leave.  The employer would then have to
submit annual reports indicating that it has maintained sufficient participation in its leave
program.  This requirement would be similar to the continuing certification requirements
under the Small Business Administration programs. 
247  A skeptical court might view such a program as a pretext for sex
discrimination, in which case the program may have to be justified along the lines
suggested in note 242 supra.
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any objections relating to a gender specific program, there is a readily
available gender neutral program that would serve the purpose of
rewarding employers for enticing their male employees to take leave.
Participation in the set-aside programs could be triggered when a
specified percentage of male and female employees have availed
themselves of the paid leave programs. For example, an employer might
be certified as eligible to participate in the program after fifty percent of
their eligible male and female employees have taken at least six weeks of
leave, and their continued participation would be tied to maintaining a
specified level of leave taking.246  Again, since women are likely to satisfy
the requirement for paid leave, the gender neutral standard would
effectively be triggered by the participation of the male employees.247  To
avoid crowding out minority and other contractors who currently
participate in the program, either a separate family leave set-aside could
be created or the goals that currently exist could be increased so as to
accommodate the new bidders. 
An alternative approach would be for the government to
require employers to provide paid leave to their employees ,and to ensure
that a minimum of fifty percent of their eligible male and female
employees take the leave , in order to qualify for federal contracts of a
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248   Pursuant to Executive Order 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), and the
implementing regulations, contractors with fifty or more employees and contracts of
$50,000 or more must implement affirmative action programs. 
249  San Francisco requires its contractors to provide benefits to domestic partners. 
See Carla Mainucci, S.F.’s New Partners Law Called Rousing Success, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Jan. 7, 1998, at A13.  In the last several years, a number of jurisdictions have required
their contractors to provide a living wage and it is now estimated that two dozen cities
have enacted such laws, with many more currently considering the idea.  See, e.g., Ron
DePasquale, Council Unanimously Approves Living-Wage Measures, BUFFALO NEWS,
July 28, 1999, at 5B; Sarah Fishman, A Living Wage Takes Effect in Somerville, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 25, 1999, at 17; Scott Wilson, Compromise Living-Wage Bill Offered in
Montgomery, WASH. POST, July 21, 1999, at B4; Nicholas Riccardi, Living Wage OK’D
By County Supervisors, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1999, at 1.    
250   See Ian Ayres & Frederick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination
Justify Public Affirmative Action? 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577, 1590-94 (1998) (discussing
amount of dollars awarded to disadvantaged businesses).  Under the Small Business
Administration’s Section 8(a) Minority Enterprise Development Program more than $6
billion is awarded annually to participating firms.  See U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMIN.,
OFFICE OF MINORITY ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT, RPT. TO CONGRESS ON MINORITY
SMALL BUSINESS AND CAPITAL OWNERSHIP DEVELOPMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997 at 26
(1998). 
251  See Ayres & Vars, supra note 250, at 1592 (noting that “MBEs were actually
33 percent more likely to sell to the government than were nonminority firms.”); John Lunn
& Huey L. Perry, Justifying Affirmative Action: Highway Construction in Louisiana, 46
INDUS. & LABOR REL. RVW. 464, 475 (1993) (finding that federal requirement to include
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certain size, akin to the existing Executive Order program.248 Local and
state governments might also tie their contracts to similar programs, as is
occurring increasingly for a variety of causes ranging from domestic
partner benefits to requirements that employers provide a so-called living
wage to their employees.249      
   It is difficult to know just how well a set-aside program might
work to reduce inequality and change gender norms.  Currently, the
government awards billions of dollars annually to disadvantaged
businesses through various contracting programs,250 and most studies
indicate that the existing programs have significantly increased
opportunities for women and minority contractors.251  Perhaps of equal
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DBEs in highway construction contracts increased representation of minority and women-
owned firms in Louisiana); Samuel L. Myers, Jr. & Tsze Chan, Who Benefits from
Minority Business Set-Asides? The Case of New Jersey, 15 J. OF POLICY ANALYSIS &
MGT. 202, 215 (1996) (finding that both the number of bids submitted and the contracts
awarded increased significantly with set-asides); William Rodgers III & William E.
Spriggs, The Effect of Federal Contractor Status on Racial Differences in Establishment-
Level Employment Shares: 1979-1992, AMERICAN ECON. RVW. PAPERS AND
PROCEEDINGS 290, 292 (1996) (finding that federal contractors increased hiring of
African Americans). 
252  Indeed, even though the set-aside programs have been under attack by a hostile
congress for a number of years, efforts to repeal the programs have been unsuccessful. 
See James Dao, Senate Stops Bid to End Road-Work-Set-Asides, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,
1998, at A9 (noting that the “Senate strongly rejected an effort today to end a two-decade
old program . . .”). 
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importance, these programs have become an integral part of the debate on
racial, and to a lesser extent gender, equality, and are now largely
enmeshed as part of our government procurement process.252  Including
family leave as part of that national dialogue would thus serve important
political interests and may help us rethink our existing policies that place
the onus of child rearing on women.  Another significant advantage of a
set-aside program is that such a program places the incentive with
employers to encourage their employees to take leave, rather than relying
on employees to take action.  As a result, employers would be far less
likely to penalize their employees for taking leave since they will  stand
to benefit from the policy, and consequently men should  no longer fear
that they will be ostracized or penalized if  they take their available leave.
         
   With this in mind, inducing substantial numbers of men to take
parental leave through a set-aside policy would have at least three
important salutary effects.  First, it would inject noise into the signal
employers currently use to discriminate against women based on their
projected labor force attachment, and thereby make the signal even less
accurate and presumably less valuable for employers.  Once men begin
to take leave, employers will be far less inclined to penalize their
employees, and will no longer be able to assume that women will bring
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253  See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187
(1991).  For a recent discussion of the case and the important role the union played see
DRUCILLA CORNELL, AT THE HEART OF FREEDOM: FEMINISM, SEX AND EQUALITY 72-81
(1998).
254  As Deborah Rhode has argued, “As long as work and family conflicts remain
primarily ‘women’s’ issues, they are unlikely to receive adequate attention in
decisionmaking structures dominated by men.”  Rhode, supra note 136, at 592.
255  See Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’
Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J. OF LAW & ECON. 305 (1998)
(arguing that workers compensation legislation succeeded where other progressive
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a disadvantage to the labor force that distinguishes them from men.  This
is, in large measure, what occurred during the litigation over fetal
protection policies where companies sought to restrict their female, but
not their male employees, from jobs where they would be exposed to high
levels of lead, even though both men and women were exposed to harmful
levels in the workplace.  When the Supreme Court struck down those
policies, as a form of gender discrimination employers  had a far stronger
incentive to reduce lead levels for all of their employees because the
relatively easy option of excluding women was no longer available.253
But such an effect can only occur if substantial, rather than token,
numbers of men begin to take leave.
   Relatedly, once more men begin to take leave, it may be possible
to create a greater coalition for incorporating family leave into the
workplace package of benefits.  A primary reason family leave remains
a secondary or tertiary benefit is that it currently applies only to women,
and most employers do not feel a need to change their policies to attract
more workers.254  But if men began to take leave at levels that were
commensurate with their stated interest, and if the issue thus became one
that affected all workers rather than just female workers, then we may see
family leave become part of the standard package of benefits, just like
health insurance or workers’ compensation.  This is, in fact, the process
that led to the adoption of  workers compensation legislation, which arose
at the turn of the century as a result of the emergence of a broad
confluence of interests between workers and employers.255  In the United
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legislation failed because it received support from broad range of interest groups); Shawn
Everett Kantor & Price V. Fishback, Precautionary Saving, Insurance and the Origins of
Workers’ Compensation, 104 J. POL. ECON. 419 (1996) (detailing the various benefits
groups obtained through legislation).
256  Although the data on the productivity gains from paid family leave policies are
limited, many have argued that such policies will ultimately enhance worker productivity. 
See WEVER, supra note 7, at 27 (arguing that paid leave increases employee morale and
reduces turnover).  The inertia described earlier, coupled with the lack of good
information, may currently prevent more employers from adopting policies, and mandating
the leave may expedite the development of efficient policies.  Cf. John J. Donohue, III, Is
Title VII Efficient? 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986) (arguing that antidiscrimination laws
decrease profits of discriminators faster than the market).  
257  Nancy Fraser has recently sought to create a similar model that combines the
best features of the competing equality and difference models that still occupy too much of
feminist theory.  Fraser concludes, “The key to making gender equity in a postindustrial
welfare state . . . is to make women’s current life-patterns the norm for everyone.” 
FRASER, supra note 19, at 61.   For a similar argument regarding the development of
sexual harassment law see Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989).  
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States, this is likely to occur only when employers realize that the costs
of allowing workers to take leave are not as high as perceived and hold
significant returns in loyalty and productivity.256  However, this
information can only be provided through experimentation, which will
require broader use of leave by both men and women.
   Finally, and in some ways most important, the proposal
effectively treats women, or more accurately the taking of leave at the
time of the birth of a child, as the norm.  Rather than requiring women to
act like men as a means of moving toward equality, the idea advanced
here requires men to act more like women, and thereby seeks to alter our
workplace expectations so that employers will expect their employees to
take some significant leave following the birth of a child.  Taking this step
forward may go a long way to dissecting our existing gender norms and
thereby reduce some of the inequality that currently results from
perceptions that are not supported by the data.257 Along the same lines,
changing the norms should help us move to a day when we no longer talk
about female and male employees, or their distinct work patterns, but
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258  The early versions of what ultimately became the FMLA contained provisions
for wage replacement but these provisions were quickly dropped in face of strong business
opposition.  See Marks, supra note 192, at 59-60 (discussing early history and its
opposition by business leaders). 
259  Any legitimate concern about increased costs could be met by amending the
FMLA so that sick leave could be used for FMLA on a discretionary basis for the six
weeks of paid leave.  Even under existing law employers have flexibility to require their
employees to take various forms of leave before they utilize the unpaid leave provided by
the FMLA.  See 29 U.S.C. §2602(d).
260  See WEVER, supra note 7, at 14.  Based on California’s experience with
disability insurance, Wever calculated that a mandatory 54% wage replacement for would
cost about $1.5 billion for California to cover all forms of currently available FMLA
leave.  Id.       
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instead can move to a less gendered work sphere.        
   Requiring employers to provide six weeks of paid leave would
almost certainly be met by vigorous opposition by employers, and their
representative groups, who would object to the potential costs of such a
mandate.258  However, the costs of the proposal should not be ruinous,
and quite possibly would not even be all that substantial.  Currently, many
employers provide forms of paid leave through other existing policies
such as sick leave and vacation time, and most women take advantage of
whatever leave is  available to them.  For these employers, a mandated
paid leave provision would simply shift the leave taking from one realm
to another with the additional costs arising from the increased numbers of
men who take leave.259  It has been estimated that California’s mandate
to fund family leave through its disability insurance program added about
20 percent to the costs of that system.260  Even assuming a higher cost,
say doubling the cost of disability insurance, the burden would still fall
below that currently required by workers compensation, as disability
insurance is one of the lowest cost benefits offered by employers.  
   Some portion of these costs would likely be passed onto
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261  This was the finding of Jonathan Gruber's study of the effects of state
mandates requiring the coverage of childbirth expenses in employer-provided insurance. 
See Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AMER. ECON.
REV. 622 (1994).   Others estimate that there will only be a small effect on wages as a
result of family leave mandates.  See Waldfogel, supra note 7, at 152 & n.17 (discussing
studies).  For additional discussions see Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal
Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361,
389 (1991) (discussing effects of mandatory product warranties for consumers); Jonathan
Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance:
Lessons from Workers’ Compensation Insurance 112, in TAX POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY (D. Bradford ed. 1991); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1492 (1998)
(relying on the endowment effect to explain the ability to pass the costs onto employees);
Lawrence Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AMER. ECON.
REV., PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 177 (1989). 
262  Gruber and Krueger estimate that 85% of the cost of workers’ compensation
insurance was borne by workers, and that the cost borne by employers likely reduced
employment by .11%, or a little more than 100,000 jobs for the 90 million workers
covered.  See Gruber & Krueger, supra note 261, at 134. A recent study of Hawaii’s
legislation mandating that employers provide health insurance found that much of the cost
of the program was passed onto workers in the form of lower wages but that there was no
apparent suppression of labor demand.  See Norman K. Thurston, Labor Market Effects of
Hawaii’s Mandatory Employer-Provided Health Insurance, 51 INDUS. & LABOR REL.
RVW. 117 (1997).  
263  See NAT’L PARTNERSHIP ON WOMEN AND FAMILIES, supra note 13, at 2.
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employees in the form of lower wages.261  Although this may appear to be
a significant disadvantage to the proposal, this effect is not unique to
family leave but is equally true for other workplace mandates, such as
workers’ compensation or health insurance.262   A significant advantage
of a set-aside program is that the costs are likely to be absorbed primarily
by the government and thus shared more broadly by its citizens.  But
given that there is nothing unique about the costs of family leave, the
proper question is whether these costs are a trade-off we are willing to
make in order to reduce gender inequality in the workplace.  As
previously noted, the survey data suggest that workers strongly support
paid leave provisions,263 and even if that were not the case, as a society
we need to make a judgment regarding the importance of incorporating
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264  This phenomenon appears to have occurred in other countries.  For example,
when asked about the costs of the extended leave mandated in Germany, one employer
noted, “[W]e don’t think about it, your question is like asking how we feel about workers
receiving Sunday as a day off.”  Allen, supra note 236 at 257.  
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family leave into the standard package of benefits offered to employees.264
After all, many employees would likely express a willingness to work in
hazardous conditions for greater pay; yet, the workplace is closely
regulated to reduce those hazards despite the effect the regulations have
on labor demand.  Accordingly, we need to get beyond the notion that
only costless programs are politically feasible; as we saw in the
discussion of the FMLA, costless programs generally provide
commensurate benefits.  If we are interested in improving the equality of
women in the workplace, then the costs of a set-aside program or of
requiring men to take leave, will be well worth the costs, and in the long
run will offer far more in return.
 
CONCLUSION
   At some point, something is going to have to give: either women
are going to have give up the hope of true workplace equality, and
relegate themselves to the predominate position of secondary status within
the workplace, or we will need to develop policies that relieve the existing
penalty imposed on women for their probability, and the reality of, having
children.  As discussed in this article, improving women’s human capital,
or trying to change women’s employment behavior in other ways, is
unlikely to lead to greater progress, and something more is needed.  In
this article, I have advocated that we find ways to encourage, or induce,
men to take leave surrounding the birth of a child, and that we do so
through providing a minimum of six weeks of paid leave and creating a
contract set-aside program that will reward employers for encouraging
their employees to take family leave.  Making these changes would only
be a start on the road to greater equality, but it would be an important,
step, indeed I believe the most important, we could make toward greater
workplace equality and one that would be worth the costs of the proposal.
